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I. INTRODUCTION

For the better part of a decade, debate has raged over whether Congress
can constitutionally restrict, or at least influence, the ability of the National
Endowment for the Arts ("NEA") to award grants to artists and institutions
for the creation or display of art work that a significant segment of the public
would consider highly offensive.' In the October 1997 Term, the Supreme
Court, by an 8-1 margin in NEA v. Finley,2 upheld section 954(d), a 1991
congressional amendment to the NEA Act that requires the Chairperson of
the NEA to ensure that, in establishing regulations and procedures for
assessing artistic excellence and artistic merit, "general standards of decency
beliefs and values of the American public" are
and respect for the diverse
3
taken into consideration.
Perhaps Finley is best understood as a prudential decision validating a
political compromise that sought to, and has largely succeeded in, ending the
arts funding controversy, as well as insulating the NEA from further and
* Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. B.A. 1970, Southern Methodist
University; J.D. 1973, University of Michigan.
1. The NEA controversy has been described in great detail elsewhere. See, e.g, John H. Garvey,

Black and White Images, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 189 (1993); Craig Alford Masback,
Independence vs. Accountability: Correctingthe StructuralDefects in the NationalEndowment for the
Arts, 10 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 177 (1992).
2, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998).
3. 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (1994).
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possibly fatal attack. If these were the goals of Congress and the Court, only
time will tell whether their efforts resulted in complete success. As a matter
of constitutional law, however, the Court confronted a very messy area of
First Amendment jurisprudence and left it even messier.
From a doctrinal and theoretical standpoint, Finley is extraordinarily
unsatisfying. Justice O'Connor's opinion for the majority makes many
salient points, but it fails to pull them together into a coherent rationale.
Glaring contradictions in the majority opinion suggest that it was the product
of a Court in agreement as to the result but not as to a rationale. Much ofthe
confusion in the opinion seems quite deliberate, as if to suggest that the Court
decided to reach a result it found difficult to justify under existing precedent,
thus producing an opinion that through obscurity might cause as little
damage as possible to the existing doctrinal framework. Justice Scalia, in
concurrence, and Justice Souter, in dissent, demonstrated that a clearer and
more principled opinion than the majority's could be written either to uphold
or invalidate the legislation. Thus, although the issue was difficult, it was
hardly intractable.
This Article analyzes the opinions in Finley, speculates on the
significance of the case, and suggests an alternative rationale for the decision
that has both advantages and disadvantages over the Court's opinion. Part II
provides a brief history of the arts funding controversy and the Finley
litigation. Part III examines the three opinions in Finley, relying heavily on
the incisive critiques of the majority opinion developed by Justices Scalia
and Souter. Part IV discusses the dynamics of the Finley opinion as an
exercise in Supreme Court decision making. Part V considers the doctrinal
impact of Finley on viewpoint discrimination and the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine. Finally, Part VI offers a doctrinal rationalization of
Finley that I believe better captures the essence of the controversy in Finley
and considers whether that rationalization would have been a preferable
approach.
II. PRELUDE TO THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
A. The Arts Funding Controversy and CongressionalResponse
The incidents giving rise to the arts funding controversy of the 1990s
have been described in detail elsewhere, necessitating only a brief summary

here.4 Congress created the NEA in 1965 as a vehicle to assist in funding the
4. See supra note 1.
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arts. 5 Grant applications are reviewed by advisory panels, which in turn make
recommendations to the NEA Chairperson.6 The program was not
particularly controversial until the NEA awarded two specific grants: the first
to the Institute of Contemporary Art at the University of Pennsylvania to
present a retrospective of the photographs of the late Robert Mapplethorpe;
and the second to the Southwest Center for Contemporary Art, which in turn
awarded a grant to an artist named Andres Serrano.7 Most of the
Mapplethorpe photographs were uncontroversial. A segment titled the X
Porfoilio, however, featured a number of sexually explicit images, including
a young girl with her vagina exposed and a man with a bullwhip protruding
from his rectum. 8 Serrano used his grant money to produce a photograph of a
crucifix immersed in urine entitled Piss Christ.9 The political fallout that
occurred once these grants attracted public attention enveloped the NEA in
controversy for the better part of a decade.
Congress responded by deleting forty-five thousand dollars, the amount
of the grants for the Mapplethorpe and Serrano exhibits, from the NEA
appropriation bill the following year. 10 Moreover, it added a clause
prohibiting the use of NEA funds
to promote, disseminate, or produce materials which in the judgment
of the [NEA] ... may be considered obscene, including but not
limited to, depictions of sadomasochism, homoeroticism, the sexual
exploitation of children, or individuals engaged in sex acts and which,
when taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value."
The NEA implemented this provision by requiring grantees to certify that
they would not expend any of the funds received in violation of these
limitations. 12 A federal district court invalidated this certification requirement
after finding the requirement both unconstitutionally vague under the Fifth
Amendment and an unconstitutional condition on freedom of speech under
the First Amendment.' 3 In addition, Congress established a temporary

5. See National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-209,
§ 5(a), 79 Stat. 845, 846 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 954(a) (1994)).

6. See 20 U.S.C. § 959(c).
7. See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2172.
8. See Garvey, supranote 1, at 190.
9. See Finley, 118S. Ct. at2172.
10. See Act of Oct. 23, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-121, 103 Stat. 701, 738-42 (making appropriations
for Department of Interior and related agencies for fiscal year ending Sept. 30, 1990).
11. Id. § 304(a), 103 Stat. at741.
12. See Bella Lewitzky Dance Found. v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774,776 (C.D. Cal. 1991).

13. See id.
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Independent Commission to study the art funding issue
and to report on the
14
procedures.
or
statute
the
to
changes
further
for
need
In September of 1990 the Independent Commission, which had taken
testimony from art and constitutional law experts, reported back to Congress5
and recommended several procedural changes to the grant-making process.'
After lengthy debate, Congress adopted several of the procedural changes
recommended by the Commission. 16 In addition, it amended the NEA Act's
Statement of Findings and Purposes to provide that "[t]he arts and the
humanities belong to all the people of the United States"' 17 and public funding
of the arts "should contribute to public support and confidence in the use of
taxpayer funds." 18 Finally, Congress enacted section 954(d), the provision at
issue in Finley, which provides:
No payment shall be made under this section except upon
application therefor which is submitted to the National Endowment for
the Arts in accordance with regulations issued and procedures
established by the Chairperson. In establishing such regulations and
procedures, the Chairperson shall ensure that(1) artistic excellence and artistic merit are the criteria by which
applications are judged, taking into consideration general standards of
decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American
public; and
(2) applications are consistent with the purpose of this section.
Such regulations shall clearly indicate that obscenity is without artistic
merit, is not protected speech, and shall not be funded.19
John Frohnmayer, the Chairperson of the NEA, maintained that the agency
could comply with these requirements simply by ensuring that the
membership on the review panels reflected the diversity of the Nation.20
B. The Finley Case
Four performance artists-Karen Finley, John Fleck, Holly Hughes, and

14. See Act of Oct. 23, 1989 § 304(c), 103 Stat. at 742.
15. See Finley, 118S.Ctat2173.

16. See Act ofNov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-512, sec. 318, § 103(e)-(i), 104 Stat. 1915, 1964-66
(codified at 20 U.S.C. § 954(i)-(I) (1994)).
17. Id. § 101, 104 Stat. at 1961.
18. Id.
19. Id. § 103(b), 104 Stat. at 1963.
20. See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at2173-74.
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Tim Miller-applied for NEA grants before the 1989 amendments. 21 An
advisory panel initially recommended approving the grants. The Chairperson,
however, sent three applications back to the panel for reconsideration, and
although the advisory panel again recommended approving all four
applications, the National Council on the Arts recommended denying them
all and the NEA followed the Council's recommendation. 2 2 The four artists
filed suit alleging violation of their First Amendment rights. After Congress
passed section 954(d) in 1990, the artists amended their complaint to
challenge that section as well.23 Early in the litigation, the NEA settled the
individual "as applied" claims of the four artists by paying them the amounts
of the contested grants plus costs and attorneys' fees.24 In 1992 the federal
district court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment
invalidating section 954(d) as unconstitutional on its face on the grounds that
it was overbroad under the First Amendment and vague under the Fifth
Amendment.2 5 In the process, the district court rejected the NEA's position
that it could comply with the statute simply by ensuring that the membership
on the review panels reflected the diversity of the Nation. 26 Instead, the
district court concluded that Congress had instructed the NEA explicitly to
consider "decency and respect for diverse beliefs and values" in the process
of reviewing each grant application.2 7 The court enjoined the enforcement of
the provision, and that injunction continued in force until the Supreme
Court's decision six years later.2
In 1996 a divided Ninth Circuit affinmed.2 9 It agreed that the statute
mandated substantive consideration of decency and respect in the grants
process rather than procedural implementation through the membership of
the review panels. 30 The court held that the criteria of decency and respect for
diverse beliefs and values were unconstitutionally vague under the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause.31 In addition, it held that these criteria
discriminated on the basis of viewpoint and that the Government failed to

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Seeid. at2174.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Finley v. NEA, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1476 (C.D. Calif. 1992).
at 1470-71.
See id.
Id. at 1470.

28. See United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at *15, NEA v. Finley, 118 S.Ct. 2168
(1998) (No. 97-371), available in 1998 WL 156955 (Mar. 31, 1998) (Oral Argument of Seth P.
Waxman on behalf of Petitioners).
29. See Finley v. NEA, 100 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1996).

30. See id. at 676-77.
31. See id. at 680.
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show that such discrimination was essential to the achievement of a
compelling state interest. 32 The court rejected the contention that protecting

the public from indecent speech or protecting the33taxpayer from unwanted

expenditures constituted compelling state interests.
Judge Kleinfield dissented, arguing that the NEA could constitutionally
consider viewpoint-based criteria such as decency and respect for diverse

beliefs and values in a competitive grant program, even though it could not
apply such criteria in a noncompetitive grant program or in a regulatory or
criminal statute.34 Three judges published a dissent from the denial of
rehearing en bane.35
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the
Ninth Circuit decision in an opinion by Justice O'Connor. Justice Scalia
wrote a separate concurrence joined by Justice Thomas. Only Justice Souter
dissented.

III. THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
ArEA v. Finley was one of the most closely watched cases of the 1997
Supreme Court Term. The issue of NEA funding had been a matter of public
debate for almost a decade. Scholars had analyzed the constitutional issues in
great detail.3 6 Both art organizations and family values groups filed amicus

briefs.37 The Court resolved the issue, but without the clarity for which many
32. See id. at 681-83.
33. See id. at 683 n.23.
34. See id. at 684-85.

35. See Finley v. NEA, 112 F.3d 1015, 1016 (9th Cir. 1997) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from
denial ofrehearing en banc).
36. See, e.g., OWEN FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED (1996); Lee C. Bollinger, Public Institutions of
Culture and the First Amendment: The New Frontier,63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1103 (1995); David Cole,
Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: ChartingSpheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech,

67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675 (1992); Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND. L. REV. 73 (1996); Robert
M. O'Neil, Artist Grants and Rights: The NEA Controversy Revisited, 9 J. HUM. RTS. 85 (1991);

Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE LJ. 151 (1996); Martin H. Redish & Daryl I. Kessler,
Government Subsidies and Free Expression, 80 MINN. L. REV. 543 (1996); Amy Sabrin, Thinking
About Content: Can It Play an AppropriateRole in Government Funding of the Arts?, 102 YALE L.J.

1209 (1993).
37. Amicus Briefs in support of respondents were filed on behalf of the New School for Social
Research and the Brennan Center for Justice, Brief as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Respondents,
NEA v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998) (No. 97-371), available in 1998 WL 3223 (Jan. 5, 1998);
Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts, Brief as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Respondents, Finley (No.
97-371), availablein 1998 WL 47261 (Feb. 6, 1998); Twenty-Six Arts, Broadcast, Library, Museum
and Publishing Amici, Brief as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Respondents, Finley (No. 97-371),
availablein 1998 WL 63172 (Feb. 6, 1998); Claes Oldenberg et al., Brief as Amicus Curiae in Support
of the Respondents, Finley (No. 97-371), available in 1998 WL 47599 (Feb, 6, 1998); Family
Research Institute of Wisconsin, Brief as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Respondents, Finley (No.
97-371), availablein 1998 WL 47273 (Feb. 6, 1998); Rockefeller Foundation, Brief as Amicus Curiae

1999]

NEA V. FINLEY

had doubtlessly hoped. It is worth working through the opinion in some
detail in order to understand the extent to which the Court's explanations are
slippery, ambiguous, and incomplete.
A. The Majority Opinion
1. The Meaning of the Statute
Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer. The
meaning of the section 954(d) obligation to "take into consideration"
decency and respect for diverse beliefs and values had been debated
throughout the litigation. From the outset, the NEA had argued that it could
discharge this obligation simply by ensuring that the membership on the
review panels reflected national diversity. Both the district court and the
court of appeals, however, decisively rejected this reading. Like the lower
courts, Justice Souter's dissent readily disposed of this reading as
inconsistent with the text and legislative history, as well as redundant
because another statutory provision already required the Chairperson to
consider diversity in selecting the panels.3 8
The majority dodged the issue by noting that it need not evaluate the
NEA's interpretation because the statute was constitutional on its face even if
construed more broadly.39 The majority opinion is remarkably vague with
regard to what exactly the statutory language entails. It seems to conclude,
however, that when Congress directed the Chairperson to consider decency
and respect, it was simply directing him to think about these factors in the
course of making a decision and to weigh them in the balance,40 but not treat
them as preclusive in and of themselves.4' In other words, a panel and the
Chairperson could find a particular project indecent and void of respect for
diverse beliefs and values and yet still award the grant on the basis of the

in Support of the Respondents, Finley (No. 97-371), available in 1998 WL 55169 (Feb. 6, 1998);
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Brief as Amicus Curiae in Support of the
Respondents, Finley (No. 97-371), available in 1998 WL 47259 (Feb. 6, 1998); and American
Association of University Professors et al., Brief as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Respondents,
Finley (No. 97-371), available in 1998 WL 47257 (Feb. 6, 1998). Amicus Briefs in Support of
Petitioner NEA were filed on behalf of Morality in Media, Amicus Brief as Amicus Curiae in Support
of the Petitioner, Finley (No. 97-371), available in 1998 WL 3223 (Jan. 5, 1998); and National Family
Legal Foundation, Brief as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioiner, Finley (No. 97-371), available

in 1998 WL 6553 (Jan. 9, 1998).
38.
39.
40.
41.

See NEA v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168,2188-89 (Souter, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2175-76.
Seeid. at2176.
Seeid.
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project's artistic excellence. This construction would seem to be the most
natural reading of the phrase "take into consideration." As Justice O'Connor
noted, "[w]hen Congress has in fact intended to affirmatively constrain the
NEA's grant-making authority, it has done so in no uncertain terms"--for
42
example, the prohibition against awarding grants for obscene works.
Neither Justice Scalia nor Justice Souter necessarily rejected the Court's
interpretation of the statute.
Justice Scalia began his opinion with the comment that '[t]he operation
was a success, but the patient died.' What such a procedure is to medicine,
the Court's opinion in this case is to the law. It sustains the constitutionality
'43
of 20 U.S.C. 954(d)(1) by gutting it.
The problem with the Court's treatment of the statute is not that the Court
read the decency and respect language as merely hortatory in nature, but
rather that it simply avoided committing to any interpretation of the statute
whatsoever. It seemed to assume that section 954(d) has some type of
substantive impact, but it refused to say what. Contrary to Justice Scalia's
remarks, the Court didn't gut the statute, it simply ignored it.
From the easily supportable conclusion that "consideration" is not
equivalent to per se prohibition, the Court reasoned that the factors to be
taken into consideration-decency and respect for diverse beliefs and
values-are not intended to "disallow any particular viewpoints. ' 4 The
Court noted that the legislation was bipartisan in nature, a compromise
position designed to counter proposals to abolish the NEA and seemingly
influenced by the Independent Commission's cautions regarding the use of
independently preclusive criteria.45 Perhaps the Court simply continued the
argument that decency and respect are merely two factors in the mix that
deserve some consideration. If so, the Ccturt's opinion may suggest that these
criteria are not viewpoint oriented simply because Congress indicated that it
did not desire to preclude any artist solely on the basis of viewpoint. If this is
the case, then Justice Scalia's 46 and Justice Souter's 47 replies, that Congress
could hardly neutralize viewpoint discriminatory criteria by declaring in the
legislative history that it did not mean to authorize censorship, are
unanswerable.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id. at 2180 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id.at2176.
See id.
concurring).
See id. at 2182 (Scalia, J.,
See id.at 2187 n.3 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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2. The Impact of the Statute
If there was any doubt where the Court was headed, however, it
proceeded to assert that the mere consideration of decency and respect, as
opposed to a flat-out prohibition, is unlikely to exert a chilling effect on the
speech of artists, presumably because the threat is too indirect or diffuse.4"
Both Justice Scalia49 and Justice Souter50 took the Court to task for
apparently assuming that consideration of a nonpreclusive factor will have no
impact. As Justice Scalia put it, "[T]he presence of the 'tak[e] into
consideration' clause 'cannot be regarded as mere surplusage; it means
something,' ... [a]nd the 'something' is that the decisionmaker, all else
that display decency and respect, and
being equal, will favor applications
5'
not."
do
that
applications
disfavor
This seems obvious unless it is assumed first that the decision maker will
ignore these criteria, and second that it is obvious to applicants that such will
be the case. That may be the practice that the NEA would pursue, however, it
is not an interpretation of the statute and its enforcement that the Court
consciously adopted. Rather, the Court seemed to assert that the criteria
simultaneously means "something" and "nothing."
a. Decency and Respect Are Not ParticularlyFocused
The primary point that the Court seemed to make in this section of its
opinion is that the decency and respect criteria are neither intended to, nor
will in practice, discriminate against specific viewpoints. It reasoned that
because decency and respect are relatively vague terms that may mean
different things to different people, they do not preclude any "particular"
viewpoint.5 2 From a standpoint of promoting free discussion, it seems
perverse to prefer a statutory term that due to its vagueness discourages
several points of view rather than just one. The notion of vagueness as an
antidote to viewpoint discrimination would seem to stand the concept of
vagueness on its head.
Perhaps the best response to this argument is that the term decency does
have a relatively clearly defined meaning. Justice Scalia, rarely far removed
from a dictionary, pointed out that "decency" is defined as .'[c]onformity to

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See id. at 2176-77.
See id. at 2181 (Scalia, J., concurring).
See id. at 2189-90 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2181 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 2177.

10
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prevailing standards of propriety or modesty."'' 5 3 Justice Souter turned
instead to an even more authoritative source, prior Supreme Court precedent
for the proposition that 'the normal definition of 'indecent' ... refers to
nonconformance with accepted standards of morality.' 54 Vagueness
arguments of the plaintiffs notwithstanding, Congress had a fairly good idea
of what it meant by decency, as do the NEA and artists applying for grants.
The Court seemed to dismiss concerns about viewpoint discrimination on
the ground that the criteria of decency and respect do not focus on "particular
views" 55 nor do they result in "directed viewpoint discrimination." 56 The
Court correctly suggested that indecent artwork could support either side of a
particular debate. For instance, different artists might paint a picture of Jesse
Helms or Karen Finley sexually abusing the Statue of Liberty to make
contrasting points about the respective threats they pose to American values.
The indecency and respect criteria could be considered content neutral with
respect to this debate, even though it is more likely that opponents of the
decency clause would use indecency to make their point than would its
proponents. The criteria, however, are anything but neutral with respect to
whether it is appropriate to use indecency as a means of artistic expression
and whether it is appropriate for artists to be disrespectful of the beliefs and
values of significant sectors of the public.
As both Justices Scalia 57 and Souter58 recognized, the statute would
clearly prefer decent and respectful art over that which is not. The
sensibilities of a Norman Rockwell or an Ansel Adams would presumably be
preferred over those of a Mapplethorpe, Serrano, or Finley. Most viewpointbased criteria could be rendered even more discriminatory by focusing them
more narrowly. For instance, a ban on indecency could be tightened into a
ban on homoerotic indecency or a ban on indecency in support of abortion.
The fact that these are even more egregious examples of viewpoint
discrimination does not render the concept of indecency itself viewpoint
neutral, however.

53. Id. at 2181 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 483 (3d ed.
1992) (second definition)).

54. Id. at 2187 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 740
(1978)).
55. Id. at 2177.
56. Id. at 2176.

57. See id.at 2181 (Scalia, J., concurring).
58. See id. At 2188 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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b. A FacialChallenge
The majority next emphasized that because the case presented only an onthe-face challenge to the legislation, "the vague exhortation to 'take them
into consideration' ... seems unlikely ... [to] introduce any greater element
of selectivity than the determination of 'artistic excellence' itself."59
Nevertheless, as Justice Souter observed, the additional selectivity introduced
by the concepts of decency and respect will inevitably be more viewpoint
oriented than the concept of artistic excellence. 60 The majority seemed
determined to ignore this point.
The Court then explained that the NEA was vested with responsibilities
such as encouraging educational programs, to which the decency criterion
would be germane, 61 and preserving our multicultural heritage, to which the
respect criterion would be relevant. 62 No sooner did the majority make this
point, however, than it conceded that "[w]e recognize, of course, that
reference to these permissible applications would not alone be sufficient to
sustain the statute against respondents' First Amendment challenge., 63 The
Court presumably made these points to bolster the argument that a facial
challenge to the statute was inappropriate, given that there seemed to be
constitutional applications. Nevertheless, the primary point that the Court
seemed to draw from these potential constitutional applications was that if
the NEA legitimately can take account of decency in some contexts without
suppressing particular viewpoints, then there is no reason why it cannot do so
in other contexts as well. 64 But if the decency and respect criteria are
acceptable in the educational context, it isn't because they are viewpoint
the fact
neutral but rather because they are pertinent and justifiable despite
66
65
that they are viewpoint discriminatory. As both Justices Scalia and Souter
recognized, and as the majority refused to admit, the justification, if any, for
admittedly viewpoint-discriminatory criteria should have been the central
issue of the case.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 2177.
See id. at 2192 n.9 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Seeid. at2177.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 2177-78.
See id. at 2183 (Scalia, J., concurring).
See id. at 2193 (Souter, J., dissenting).

12
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3. Application of the Rosenberger Case
The majority then turned its attention to Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of University of Virginia,6 7 apparently the most pertinent precedent.
The majority distinguished the Rosenbergerfacts from the facts in Finley. In
Rosenberger, the Court found unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination
when the University created a limited public forum by subsidizing the
printing costs of student publications, except those presenting a religious
perspective.68 In Finley, however, according to the majority, the NEA art
funding project was designed not to 'encourage a diversity of views from
private seakers'" but rather to encourage excellence through a competitive
process. The Court reasoned that in a competitive process, unlike a public
forum, judgments on whether to subsidize will inevitably be based on
content, at least in the form of artistic excellence.70
Justice Scalia also distinguished Rosenberger,but solely on the basis that
arguing that whether
the University had established a limited public forum,
71
the process was competitive or not was irrelevant.
Justice Souter, on the other hand, maintained that Rosenbergercontrolled
and that it prohibited the NEA's use of viewpoint-based criteria.72 He argued
that, like the student activity fund in Rosenberger, Congress had declared
that the NEA grant program was designed "to 'support new ideas' and 'to
help create and sustain ... a climate of encouraging freedom of thought,
imagination, and inquiry."' 73 As such, the NEA may not deny applications
due to the unpopularity of the viewpoint expressed.74 Justice Souter argued
that Rosenberger effectively rejected the Finley majority's attempt to
distinguish NEA funding on account of its competitive nature when it
declared that "'[t]he government cannot justify viewpoint discrimination
among private speakers on the economic fact of scarcity."' 7 5 Rather, even
where funds are scarce, the Government must base selection on viewpointneutral criteria.76 Justice Souter also argued that, contrary to Justice Scalia's
interpretation, Rosenberger did not turn on the conclusion that the student
fund was a public forum, and in any event, the Court had established that

67. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
68. See id. at 834-36.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2178 (quoting Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 835).
See id. at 2177-78.
See id. at 2184 (Scalia, J., concurring).
See id. at 2191 (Souter, J., dissenting).

73. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 951(10), (7) (1994)).
74. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 2192 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 835).
76. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
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viewpoint discrimination is impermissible even in nonpublic forums.7 7
Rosenbergerwould seem to be the most pertinent precedent to the NEA
controversy. Nevertheless, it is hardly on all fours with Finley and thus
requires thoughtful consideration. Justice O'Connor's reading of the case is
defensible. The majority's primary distinction between the competitive grant
process in Finley and the broadly available fund in Rosenberger is factually
accurate. In contrast, Justice Souter's argument is misleading when he
suggests that Rosenberger anticipated and disposed of the possibility of a
competitive subsidization process issue with its notation that "the
government cannot justify viewpoint discrimination among private speakers
on the economic fact of scarcity. ' 'T8 The Finley majority did not contend that
scarcity leads to selectivity, but rather that a competitive process inevitably
leads to selectivity. Aside from the fact that all resources-especially cash
grants-are somewhat scarce, an institution could parcel out scarce resources
in relatively small amounts to all applicants (as was presumably done in
Rosenberger) or it could dispense them on a first-come-first-served basis. By
definition, however, a competitive process will result in the denial of many, if
not most, applications on the basis of some criteria. Likewise, in a given year,
the NEA could deny many applications and decline to dispense all of the
funds available simply because there were an insufficient number of
"artistically excellent" proposals. Consequently, Justice Souter's conclusion
that "the Court's 'competition' is merely a surrogate for 'scarcity' is simply
incorrect.
A competitive process requires the use of selection criteria that are
unnecessary in a noncompetitive process. Thus, the majority explained that,
unlike the student fund in Rosenberger, the NEA relies on an inherently
content-based "excellence threshold" in evaluating applications. 79 Justice
Souter recognized this but argued that Rosenberger requires the state to use
only viewpoint-neutral criteria, even in a competitive process. 80 Artistic
excellence, though content based, would satisfy Justice Souter while
viewpoint-oriented criteria such as decency and respect would not. On its
facts, however, Rosenberger doesn't go so far because, contrary to Justice
Souter's interpretation, it did not address the problem of viewpoint neutrality
in a competitive selection process.
Explaining that the NEA funding process is competitive and that the
Rosenberger program wasn't is a start, but to adequately distinguish

77.
78.
79.
80.

See id. at 2192 n.10 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 835.
Finley, 118 S.Ct. at2178.
dissenting).
See id. at 2192 n.9 (Souter, J.,
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Rosenberger,the Court needed to explain why using a competitive process is
sufficient to legitimize viewpoint-based discrimination. The Court's terse
explanation was that in the arts funding context "the Government does not
indiscriminately 'encourage a diversity of views from private speakers.' 8
It certainly does not follow, however, that because the Government may
utilize content-based but viewpoint-neutral selection criteria in a competitive
process, it may in turn use viewpoint-based criteria as well. But the Court's
holding does not appear to extend so far. Rather, the Court seemed to be
taking issue with Justice Souter's conclusion that the primary point of the arts
funding program is to support and encourage debate, discourse, or diversity
of ideas. Instead, the Court seemed to suggest that the point of the program is
to encourage good art regardless of whether it leads to a public forum-like
environment. Thus, for the majority, diversity of viewpoint in NEA funded
art would seem to be more of a happy by-product of the program than its
intended goal.
Relying on the NEA Act itself, Justice Souter argued that encouraging
diversity of viewpoint is far more central to the NEA's mission than the
majority seemed willing to concede.8 2 But assuming that the majority's
conception of the NEA's mission is accurate, it still failed to explain why
consideration of decency and respect for diverse beliefs and values is
justifiable in such a context. Had the Court truly believed that the criteria of
decency and respect were viewpoint neutral, it could have readily
distinguished Rosenberger on that basis alone. The fact that the Court
labored mightily to distinguish Rosenbergeron other grounds suggests that it
understood that section 954(d) presented a serious viewpoint-discrimination
issue.
Having disposed of Rosenberger,however, at least to its own satisfaction,
the Court did not suggest that in a competitive subsidy process the
Government can freely discriminate on the basis of viewpoint without
limitation. To the contrary, emphasizing that the challenge to section 954(d)
was on its face rather than as applied and that there were no allegations
before the Court that any particular grant had been denied on account of
viewpoint discrimination, the majority cited several precedents for the
proposition that "even in the provision of subsidies, the Government may not
'ai[m] at the suppression of dangerous ideas."' 83 The majority also noted that
"a more pressing constitutional question would arise if government funding
resulted in the imposition of a disproportionate burden calculated to drive

81.

Id. at 2178 (quoting Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 834).

82. See id. at 2191 (Souter, J., dissenting)
83. Id. at 2178 (quoting Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983)).
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'certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.' ' ' 4 As a result, the
majority indicated that if, in a given case, the NEA applies the criteria in
issue in a manner that appears intended to suppress a viewpoint or at least has
that effect, a serious First Amendment question will exist. Therefore, the key
to Finley may be that the case presented an on-the-face challenge, leaving the
Court's standard viewpoint discrimination doctrine to be applied with
customary rigor upon a showing that a particular application was denied
because it was indecent or disrespectful.
4. Subsidization vs. Regulation and a Justificationfor Viewpoint
Discrimination
The majority ended section 1-A of its opinion by upholding the
constitutionality of the challenged provision on its face. At that point, one
might assume that the opinion is about to end, given that the majority
purported to have resolved the issue presented. The majority, however, added
a short but significant paragraph headed IH-B that seems to qualify, perhaps
significantly, much of what was said in the preceding paragraph. After
having just suggested that an actual viewpoint-based denial would raise
serious First Amendment concerns, the majority observed that "although the
First Amendment certainly has application in the subsidy context, we note
that the Government may allocate competitive funding according to criteria
that would be impermissible were direct regulation of speech... at stake." 5
Citing Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington,86 Rust v.
Sullivan,87 and Maher v. Roe,8 8 the majority explained that the Government
has wide discretion to choose spending priorities or to engage in selective
funding without discriminating on the basis of viewpoint.8 9 In the midst of
this paragraph, the majority pointed out that "Congress modified the
declaration of purpose in the NEA's enabling act to provide that arts funding
should 'contribute to public support and confidence in the use of taxpayer
funds."' 90 Presumably, the majority was suggesting that contributing to
public support and confidence through the consideration of decency and
respect is a legitimate choice of priorities, analogous to the decision in Regan

84.
502 U.S.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 2178-79 (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.,
105, 116 (1991)).
Id. at 2179.
461 U.S. 540 (1983).
500 U.S. 173 (1991).
432 U.S. 464 (1977).
See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2179.
Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 951(5) (1994)).
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to subsidize lobbying only by veterans groups 91 through a tax exemption or
the decision in Rust to subsidize preconceptional but not abortion
counseling. 92 If so, then effectuating this congressional choice of priorities by
denying an application on the grounds of indecency could hardly violate
freedom of speech any more than denying a grant pursuant to the program in
Rust because the grantee intended to engage in abortion counseling.
Apparently, section II-B attempts at least to acknowledge the existence of
relevant unconstitutional conditions doctrine precedent such as Regan, Rust,
and Maher without actually engaging in detailed analysis of the issues from
that perspective.
Arguably, this ambiguous paragraph represents the only point in the
majority's opinion that even comes close to addressing the central issue
raised by the case-that is, when Congress chooses to subsidize art, may it
disfavor some proposals (the indecent and the disrespectful) either to protect
the public from the indignity of having its tax dollars sponsor work that many
consider deeply offensive or to at least prevent the ensuing controversy from
undermining the program. Notably absent from the majority's opinion in
Finley is any consideration of why Congress might have enacted section
954(d) and whether such reasons are capable of justifying viewpointdiscriminatory criteria. 93 In this paragraph, the majority briefly flirted with
the question ofjustification but failed to confront it.
By way of contrast, the issues that the Court slid past obliquely in section
1-B are at the very core of Justice Scalia's opinion. From his perspective, the
Government's all but unconstrained freedom to set its priorities and choose
what speech to subsidize, even94if based on viewpoint, is more than sufficient
to resolve the case in its favor.
Justice Souter reached the opposite conclusion, noting that both Regan
and Rust held that the selective-funding programs in issue were not
viewpoint discriminatory, and each had indicated that the programs would
95
likely have been unconstitutional had they been viewpoint discriminatory.
This led him to conclude that these cases were off point and that
Rosenberger,prohibiting viewpoint selective subsidization, was the case that
really mattered.96
Section 1I-B of the majority's opinion has a tacked-on quality, suggesting

91.
92.
93.
94.

See Regan, 461 U.S. at 550-51.
See Rust, 500 U.S. at 179.
See infra notes 189-95 and accompanying text.
See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2184 (Scalia, J., concurring).

95. See id. at 2190-91 (Souter, J., dissenting).
96. See id. at 2191 (Souter, 3., dissenting).
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that it was the product of or an offering to one or more Justices who did not
fully agree with the approach in II-A, but who were willing to join in the
opinion if the majority included some language suggesting, somewhat along
the lines of the Scalia concurrence, that Congress has significantly greater
discretion to engage in content and perhaps even viewpoint-based selectivity
in a subsidization (as opposed to a regulation) context. This suggests that in
future cases involving either NEA funding or other subsidization programs,
at least some of the Justices who joined the Finley majority opinion may
build on the section 1-B qualification and possibly de-emphasize the
language to the contrary in the preceding paragraph. From the standpoint of
offering a forthright and coherent opinion in Finley, however, the Court
should have directly confronted the issue raised but slighted in section 1-B.
Nevertheless, the Court was probably unable to build a majority to do so.
5. Vagueness
The final two paragraphs of the majority's opinion in section iII
addressed the issue of vagueness because the district court and court of
appeals both found section 954(d)(1) unconstitutionally vague. The majority
conceded that the terms in question are perhaps too opaque for a criminal
statute. It concluded, however, that the terms possessed sufficient clarity for
the subsidization context because artists were unlikely to be substantially
chilled. The majority also asserted that some degree of generality is
inevitable in a competitive program promoting excellence.97 It noted that
would be in jeopardy if the NEA criteria
several other federal grant programs
98
were unconstitutionally vague.
As with the issue of content discrimination, Justice Scalia concluded that
the vagueness doctrine had no application whatsoever to subsidization as
opposed to regulation.99 Justice Souter rejected the vagueness challenge in a
footnote, agreeing with the majority that100a degree of imprecision is
unavoidable in the competitive grant context.
Arguably, the vagueness issue was not as easy as the Supreme Court
suggested. Both the district court and the court of appeals made credible
arguments for vagueness. The fact that no member of the Supreme Court was
troubled about vagueness suggests that they were indeed concerned with a
precedent that might cut deeply into less controversial grant programs. All

97. See id. at 2179-80.
98. Seeid. at2180.

99. See id. at 2184 (Scalia, J., concurring).
100. See id. at 2196 n.17 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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things considered, however, the majority's treatment of vagueness would be
fairly unremarkable but for the fact that it had suggested earlier in its opinion
that the terms decency and respect could scarcely be viewpoint
01
discriminatory given that no two people could agree on what they meant.
In other words, the criteria were too vague to be unconstitutionally
discriminatory but not too vague to be unconstitutionally vague.
6. Summary
In summary, the majority in Finley held that section 954(d)(1) is not
viewpoint discriminatory, at least to an unconstitutional degree, because the
criteria are mere factors rather than flat prohibitions. That is, Congress
purported not to discriminate against point of view because the criteria are
too vague to single out a particular viewpoint. Moreover, content-based
criteria are inevitable in a competitive grant process. Such criteria are not
unconstitutional on their face because they have obviously valid applications.
The criteria might be unconstitutional if they were used to discriminate
against particular points of view in an individual case. Then again, the
Government has far more room to rely on content in a subsidization as
opposed to a regulation case. Finally, the criteria are not vague.
This summary, however, makes the opinion seem more coherent than it
is. In fact, the majority's opinion jumps from one argument to the next
without any sense of logic or closure. It is self-contradictory from paragraph
to paragraph and often from one sentence to the next. It labors to obscure the
significant issues raised by the case. Finally, it appears to be largely oblivious
to the forceful criticisms leveled at it by the concurrence and dissent.
B. JusticeScalia 's Concurrence
Much of Justice Scalia's concurrence is a point by point response to the
majority opinion. To the extent I have noted these arguments above, I will
not repeat them here in any detail.
In the first section of the concurrence, Justice Scalia establishes beyond
argument that the obligation to take the disputed criteria "into consideration"
means that they should have some substantive effect in the decision-making
process with respect to individual applications.102 This point was equally
made by Justice Souter' 0 3 and both lower court opinions. 0 4 Justice Scalia

101. Seeid.at 2176-77.
102. See id. at 2180-81 (Scalia, J., concurring).
103. See id.at 2188 (Souter, J., dissenting).

1999]

NEA V. FINLEY

then pointed out that the decency and respect criteria need not be conclusive
to have the type of impact that implicates freedom of speech.10 5 This seems
obvious despite the majority's attempts to obscure the matter. Then, as set
forth above, 106 Justice Scalia argued that the terms decency and respect, as
used in the legislation and as commonly understood, are viewpoint
discriminatory. 0 7 Once again, Justice Scalia clearly got the best of this
dispute with the majority.
The primary thrust of Justice Scalia's concurrence, however, is that
Congress has every right to discriminate on the basis of viewpoint in a
subsidy program because it is unlikely to have a coercive effect.'0 8 Justice
Scalia instructed the Court, "The Statute Means What It Says." 10 9 The
majority might well have replied, "So Does the Precedent." Unlike the
majority, Justice Scalia grappled with the central issues in the case and built a
clear and logical argument. But in order to treat viewpoint discrimination as a
nonissue in the subsidization context, however, he had to disregard several
cases in which the Court assumed that First Amendment principles do apply,
at least to some extent, to Government subsidies." 0
Justice Scalia cited Rust v. Sullivan for the proposition that the
Government can 'selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities
... without at the same time funding an alternate program."''" He failed to
acknowledge, however, that Rust suggested that favoring a particular
viewpoint through subsidization might not be acceptable in certain spheres of
discourse in which free speech values predominate, such as a public forum or
a public university."12 Thus, if Rust supports the constitutionality of the NEA
criteria, there should at least be some explanation as to why public arts
funding should not be included in this "sphere of discourse" exception.

104. See Finley v. NEA, 100 F.3d. 671, 676-77 (9th Cir. 1996); Finley v. NEA, 795 F. Supp.
1457, 1470-71 (C.D. Cal. 1992).
105. See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2181 (Scalia, J., concurring).
106. See supra Part III.A.
107. See Finley, 118 S. CL at 2181 (Scalia, J., concurring).
108. See id. at 2183-84 (Scalia, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 2180 (Scalia, J., concurring) (title of section I of his opinion).
110. First and foremost, in Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987), the
Court invalidated a state statute that excluded certain magazines and journals from receiving a tax
exemption. In order to support his argument in Finley that subsidies, whether direct or by exemption,
are generally not sufficiently coercive to violate the First Amendment, Justice Scalia resorted to citing
his own dissenting opinion in Arkansas Writers' Project. See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2183 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (quoting Arkansas Writers' Project,481 U.S. at 237 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). Curiously
enough, the majority cited other language in Scalia's Arkansas Writers' Project dissent for the
proposition that discriminatory subsidies could violate freedom of speech. See id. at 2178 (quoting
Arkansas Writers'Project,481 U.S. at 237 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
111. Id. at 2183 (Scalia, J. concurring) (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991)).
112. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 200.
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Justice Scalia rejected as mistaken the respondent's attempt to distinguish
Rosenberger as a case in which the Government paid someone else to
propagate its own message, instead of expending funds to encourage diverse
viewpoints from private speakers. 13 Justice Scalia failed to acknowledge,
however, that this was not merely the respondent's creative reading of
Rosenberger, but rather the Rosenberger Court's explicit interpretation of
Rust.'1 4 In explaining why such a distinction should not make a difference
either as a matter of constitutional law or common sense, Justice Scalia
assumed that if the Government decides to promulgate a message, it can
either do so directly, hire others to promulgate it, or subsidize others to
promulgate it." 5 Assuming that this is true, it seems to offer only strained
characterizations of the NEA arts funding program. To Justice Scalia, the
Congress, through the NEA, is spending money to promulgate excellent art
that is neither indecent nor disrespectful of diverse beliefs and values. In
contrast, to Justice Souter, Congress is spending funds to encourage a wide
range of artistic creativity wholly apart from its viewpoint, as long as what is
subsidized is excellent, decent, and respectful. Thus, while Justice Scalia
believed that the conditions (decency and respect) define the program and
are the messages that the Government desires to transmit, as in Rust, Justice
Souter believed that these conditions subtract from an otherwise diverse
marketplace of ideas created by the Government, as in Rosenberger.
Arguably, neither characterization fully captures the arts funding program.
Justice Souter, however, seems closer to the reality than does Justice Scalia.
Ultimately, Justice Scalia distinguished Rosenberger as a case in which
the state established a limited public forum. 1 6 This is a strained reading of
the case. But if Scalia is correct, he failed to explain why the subsidization
program in Rosenbergerwas a public forum and the NEA program was not.
Moreover, he failed to respond to Justice Souter's argument that forum type
precedents,
should not make a difference because, under the Court's
1
regulation of nonpublic forums must be viewpoint neutral." 7
Justice Scalia summarized his position by explaining, "I regard the
distinction between 'abridging' speech and funding it as a fundamental
divide, on this side of which the First Amendment is inapplicable.'l1 Unlike
the majority opinion, Justice Scalia's approach is clear and as a matter of first

113. See Finley, 118 S.Ct. at 2184 (Scalia, J., concurring).
114. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833-34 (1995).
115.
116.
117.
118.

See Finley, 118 S.Ct. at 2184 (Scalia, J., concurring).
See id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Finley, 118 S.Ct. at 2178 (majority opinion)).
See id. at 2192 n.10 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2184 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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impression intuitively sensible. The obvious drawback, however, is that he
can derive this principle only by disregarding or mischaracterizing much of
the relevant precedent.
C. Justice Souter's Dissent
Only Justice Souter dissented. As with Justice Scalia's opinion, much of
Justice Souter's dissent offers specific counterarguments to the majority
opinion which have been discussed above and which will not be restated in
any detail.
Justice Souter began by emphasizing the bedrock principle that the First
Amendment prohibits viewpoint discrimination. 1 9 He then concluded that
both the text and history of section 954(d) show that it was intended to, and
does in fact, disfavor some speech because of its message. 120 Expounding on
that conclusion, he argued that it is irrelevant from a First Amendment
are total prohibitions or merely
perspective whether the forbidden criteria
12 1
factors in the decision-making process.
Unlike the majority or Justice Scalia, Justice Souter attempted to develop
carefully the distinctions between the Government as speaker or buyer, the
Government as regulator (as suggested by Rust and Rosenberger), and the
Government as patron (as suggested by the Solicitor General). 122 Noting that
the Government conceded that it was acting as neither speaker nor buyer
through the NEA program, Justice Souter found that Rosenbergerrather than
Rust was the most pertinent precedent. 23 He then concluded that
consideration of decency and respect by the NEA is impermissible viewpoint
discrimination in a program subsidizing private speech, just as the
prohibition of funding publications with a religious perspective was in
Rosenberger 24 As noted above, Justice Souter rejected the majority's
attempt to distinguish NEA funding from Rosenberger as a competitive
selection process 2265 as well as Justice Scalia's attempt to distinguish it as a
nonpublic forum.
Justice Souter explicitly addressed the Government's argument that the
Court should recognize a new analytical category for Government patronage,

119.
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121.
122.
123.

See id. at 2185 (Souter, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2188-90 (Souter, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2189-90 (Souter, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2190-91 (Souter, J., dissenting).
See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).

124. See id. at 2191-92 (Souter, J., dissenting).
125. See id. at 2192 n.8 (Souter, J., dissenting).
126. See id. at 2192 n.10 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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but he rejected it on the ground that the Government failed to justify the need
for such a creation. 127 Perhaps such a new characterization most accurately
describes what is at stake. None of the existing characterizations quite
capture the NEA funding program. The Government is not speaking. It is not
buying art. It is not hiring private parties to propagate its message. It is not
regulating speech. It is not simply creating a public forum to encourage
discourse (although this comes closer than the alternatives). Rather, it is
encouraging artistic expression within a framework of excellence, decency,
and respect for diverse beliefs and values. It is not simply sponsoring a
message or viewpoint as Justice Scalia would have it, nor is it creating an
unconstrained public forum as Justice Souter suggests. It is doing something
in between. The Government's characterization of the NEA as patron may
the essence of the program
not be perfect, but it comes closer to capturing
28
than any of the competing characterizations.1
Justice Souter ended his opinion with a lengthy response to the majority's
distinction between an as-applied invalidation and an on-the-face challenge
of section 945(d)(1). 129 He maintained that the contexts in which decency
and respect could be constitutionally taken into consideration are quite
limited; thus the statute is substantially overbroad and ripe for facial
challenge. 130 Moreover, he found it likely that section 954(d) will cause
artists to modify their work to obtain grants or to forego the grant-making
process, thus chilling artistic expression either way.' 31 Justice Souter's
analysis of the appropriateness of a full facial challenge under the
circumstances is more consistent with the precedent than the majority's halfhearted suggestions to the contrary.
Justice Souter's opinion is the most satisfying of the three. Unlike the
majority, he faced the issue squarely. Unlike Justice Scalia, he attempted to
address and apply relevant precedent. His analysis is largely consistent with
established doctrine. Yet, as noted above, Justice Souter attempted to cram

127. See id. at 2192-93 (Souter, J., dissenting).
128. Assuming the creation of a new analytical category might be helpful, at least as a descriptive
matter, there remains the question of what to do with it. That is, what standard of review should apply
when the Government acts as patron? The Government contended that a rational basis test should
apply. Justice Souter dismissed this as too lenient in a case involving viewpoint discrimination. See id.
at 2193. The concluding Part of this Article argues that patronage is different and that the Government
should be permitted to condition its grants of patronage, at least in the arts, on an agreement to respect
certain widely shared public sensibilities. The majority hinted at this in section II-B of its opinion, and
Justice Souter briefly considered and rejected it in his dissent. Nevertheless, neither gave this argument
the full consideration that it deserved.

129. See id. at 2193-96 (Souter, J., dissenting).
130. See id. at 2194-95 (Souter, J., dissenting).

131. See id. at 2195 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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the factual situation into doctrinal characterizations that fail to capture the
dynamics of the controversy. Justice Souter's failure to convince even one
other member of the Court to concur in his careful, craftsmanlike analysis
suggests that this case offered something else that his doctrinally predictable
approach failed to address.
IV. THE DYNAMICS OF THE FINLEY CASE

In Finley, the Court addressed a legal issue that had been debated and
analyzed in the law reviews for the better part of a decade. The Court
benefited from a court of appeals decision with a strong dissent that
presented the basic arguments with clarity. The Court received thorough
briefs from many leading lawyers and law professors. In short, the Court had
sufficient resources available to resolve the issue persuasively one way or the
other. The Court decided the case, of course, but with an extraordinarily
muddled opinion. Justice Scalia's concurrence was far more precise
analytically but was too extreme and too disrespectful of precedent to attract
more than Justice Thomas's vote. Justice Souter's dissent was largely
consistent with current doctrine and under other circumstances might have
attracted a majority of the Court. Yet, in Finley, it failed to garner another
vote. Obviously, this requires explanation or at least invites speculation.
The most obvious explanation of Finley is that the Court simply decided
to validate the political compromise that Congress and the NEA worked out
in order to defuse the controversy swirling around the agency since 1989.
Certain factions in Congress largely created the NEA funding controversy in
response to the Mapplethorpe and Serrano grants, forcing Congress to cope
with it in some politically feasible manner. 132 Few members of Congress
would relish explaining to constituents why they voted against decency in

arts funding.
Following the report of the Independent Commission, Congress added
section 954(d)(1) to stress artistic excellence, but with decency and respect
for diverse beliefs and values taken into consideration. This provided
Congress with political cover. Moreover, almost from the outset, the
Chairperson of the NEA effectively read the decency clause out of the
legislation by determining that he could meet his obligations under the statute
by ensuring that membership on the panels comprised people of diverse
beliefs and values.' 33 During oral argument in Finley, Justice Scalia noted

132. See generally John E. Frohnmayer, Giving Offense, 29 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 5 (1993); Garvey,
supranote 1, at 190-97.
133. See Finley, 118 S. Ct, at 2173-74.
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that such efforts might address the obligation to respect diversity, but he

wondered whether the Chairperson also went out of his way to appoint
decent people to the panels to fulfill the decency requirement. 3 As
construed by the Chairperson, however, the decency and respect clauses, as
such, posed little realistic threat to the arts community. But it became
apparent that the NEA had internalized the lessons of the Mapplethorpe and
Serrano controversies and had decided to attempt to steer clear of obviously
controversial grants to the extent possible in order to avoid reigniting the
controversy. 35 Consequently, the authority to award grants to individual
performing artists such as Karen Finley recently has been cut back

substantially. 136 Also, attempts to defund or eliminate the NEA have been
beaten back politically, although its budget has been decreased
significantly.137 Essentially, before the Court decided Finley, the political
process had worked out a rough compromise that gave opponents of the
NEA some things to crow about, minimized the actual First Amendment
threat, and protected the NEA against future political assault.
While the Court may have validated this political compromise, it does not
deserve credit for saving the NEA as such. The NEA apparently had
weathered the political storm, and it is unlikely that a judicial invalidation of

the decency and respect clause would have led to a serious assault on its
continued existence, especially considering the fact that the agency had been

enjoined from enforcing section 954(d)(1) almost since its enactment. Had
the Court invalidated the decency and respect criteria, Congress might have
proposed new constraints on the NEA's discretion which probably would

134. See United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at *7, Finley (No. 97-371), available in
1998 WL 156955 (Mar. 31, 1998) (Oral Argument of Seth P. NVaxman on Behalf of the Petitioners).
135. Anne-Imelda Radice, the Chairperson of the NEA who succeeded John Frohnmayer after he
was forced to resign in 1992, made it clear that she would be sensitive to taxpayer sensibilities in
considering grant applications. See Kim Masters, Acting Arts Chief Vows to Keep It Clean; House
Testimony byAnne-Imelda Radice Seen Reversing Frohnmayer,WASH. POST, May 6, 1992, at Al.
Quite recently, the Chairperson of the NEA canceled a grant to fund the printing of a children's
book entitled The Story of Colors written by a Mexican guerrilla leader. See Julia Preston, N.E.A.
Couldn't Tell a Book by Its Cover, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1999, at Al. The book refers to characters
smoking pipes and making love and includes an illustration of "a reclining naked woman in a sexual
embrace with a figure that appears to be a male God." Id at A8. The Chairperson explained that the
grant was rescinded not because of the contents of the book but rather out of concern that the funds
would be used to support guerrilla activity. See id.
From the newspaper description, it would not seem that the book would be considered indecent or
disrespectful of the diverse beliefs and values of the American public although it might be deemed
inappropriate for young children.
136. See Act of Nov. 14, 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-83, § 329, 111 Stat. 1543, 1600 (making
appropriations for Department of Interior and related agencies for fiscal year ending Sept. 30, 1998).
137. See Katharine Q. Seelye, For Election Year, House Approves Arts Financing,N.Y. TIMES,
July 22, 1998, at Al.
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have led to further litigation. But even in the absence of any congressional
limitation, the NEA would be unlikely to deliberately approve grants that
might plunge it back into the political turmoil from which it had only
recently escaped.
The easiest and quite possibly the most accurate explanation of the Finley
opinion is that a majority of the Court examined the existing state of affairs,
concluded that it had worked relatively effectively, and decided to leave well
enough alone. The majority opinion then seems to be an attempt to preserve
the status quo and minimize any long-term damage to First Amendment
doctrine.
This interpretation fits nicely with the analysis set forth in two recent
forewords to the HarvardLaw Review's Supreme Court Note. In an article
entitled Law as Equilibrium,Professors William Eskridge and Philip Frickey
argued that the Court generally is and should be hesitant to interfere with
states of equilibrium achieved on controversial issues by competing political
institutions. 138 The Finley decision appears to exemplify such strategic
behavior.
The following year, Professor Cass Sunstein contributed a foreword
entitled Leaving Things Undecided1 39 in which he argued that when the
Court agrees on a result but finds it difficult to agree on a satisfying legal
rationale, it often writes opinions which he refers to as "incompletely
theorized agreements."' 40 That is, the Court decides the case but leaves to
subsequent Courts the task of explaining how the decision fits into the
existing doctrinal and theoretical frameworks. 14 1 The Court generally must
say something, though what it says may be incomplete, confusing, and
internally inconsistent. 142 Professor Sunstein used Romer v. Evans1 43 as a
prime example of such an opinion. 144 Had he written his foreword two years
later, NEA v. Finley would have illustrated his thesis just as nicely. Finley is
an example of "decisional minimalism" to use another of his
characterizations, 145 in that it assiduously avoids bold doctrinal or theoretical
pronouncements. Similarly, like many minimalistic opinions, its internal

138. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 TermForeword:Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REv. 26 (1994).
139. Cass R Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided,
110 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1996).
at 20 (emphasis omitted).
140. Id.
141. Seeid. at21-25.
142. See id.
143. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
144. See Sunstein, supranote 139, at 57-70.
145. Id. at 4.
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contradictions suggest that it was the product of severe disagreement within
the Court regarding the appropriate rationale. In Finley, where the Court
found itself probably facing some internal disagreement as well as wrestling
with a politically controversial issue already largely resolved by other
branches of the Government, the Court did what Professor Sunstein argued
that it would and should do-it resolved the case with a narrow and shallow
opinion, leaving larger doctrinal and theoretical issues undecided.

V. THE DOCTRINAL IMPACT OF FNLEY
The Court in Finley may well have intended to decide a politically
troublesome case in a way that would have been difficult to justify under
existing doctrine while minimizing damage to that doctrine. The Court may
have hoped that its opinion was sufficiently muddled so as to be of little use
in the future, or it may have hoped to successfully limit its holding to the
facts in subsequent litigation. Once the Court releases an opinion, however, it
cannot control how it will be used by Justices in future cases, much less how
lower federal and state courts will use it. Certainly, some of the language in
Finley, if taken seriously, can cause analytical confusion in the future,
particularly in two areas: viewpoint discrimination and unconstitutional

conditions.
A. Viewpoint Discrimination

The prohibition against viewpoint discrimination in the arts context is
now one of the most central tenets in the Court's freedom of speech
jurisprudence over the past two decades. 4 6 Stating the rule is easier than
applying it, however. Commentators have faulted the Court for failing to

define adequately the concept of viewpoint discrimination or even to
distinguish it sufficiently from content discrimination, which though
troublesome, is more permissible.

7

Not surprisingly, the Justices have not

always agreed when classifying a particular regulation as viewpoint or
146. See NEA v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2185-86 (1998) (Souter, J., dissenting) (compiling
cases).
147. See DANIEL FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 28 (1998); Kent Greenawalt, Viewvpointsfrom

Olympus, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 697, 700 (1996); Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 24
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 99, 110 (1996); Elena Kagan, The Changing Faces of First Amendment
Neutrality: R.A.V. v St. Paul, Rust v Sullivan, and the Problem of Content-Based Underinclusion,
1992 Sup. CT. REv. 70; Sabrin, supra note 36, at 1210; Frederick Schauer, The Supreme Court 1997
Term-Comment: Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84, 105
(1998).
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content discriminatory. 1
Finley should add to the confusion. The Court seemed to deny that
section 954(d)(1) was viewpoint discriminatory, at least in any sharp and
particular sense. It based this to a large degree on excerpts from the
legislative history indicating that Congress did not intend to preclude any
specific viewpoint, as well as on its own conclusion that the decency and
respect criteria are too vague to prohibit any particular point of view. 149 The
Court seemingly treated decency and respect as limitations on mode or style
of speech rather than point of view or perspective, although it did not
explicitly make this claim. It also seemed to suggest that singling out a
particular viewpoint is essential to the success of an on-the-face as opposed
to an as-applied challenge.150
None of this seems sensible or even consistent with existing precedent.
Considering that precedent clearly has established viewpoint discrimination
as one of the primary villains under the First Amendment, legislators who
intend to burden viewpoints will likely proclaim the opposite. If a law
appears to be viewpoint discriminatory, self-serving legislative disclaimers
offer little more than an attempt to persuade the Court that the words do not
mean what they say.
The Court's emphasis on the vagueness of the criteria seems to be used to
bolster its argument that Congress neither intended to nor did in fact single
out any specific viewpoint, such as "capitalism leads to inequality" or
"affirmative action is a form of racism." Thus, indecent art could further
either side of these or any other debates. As such, indecency or lack of
respect is more of a style or mode of argument than a viewpoint or
perspective. Although there is a certain amount of truth in this argument, it
misses another truth: the criteria of decency and respect essentially embody
the viewpoint that it is inappropriate to be indecent and disrespectful.
The Court confronted a somewhat similar dispute over the meaning of
viewpoint discrimination in R.A. V v. City of St. Paul,'51 perhaps the Court's
leading recent viewpoint discrimination case. The Court resolved that case
contrary to the way it resolved Finley. In his concurrence, Justice Stevens
argued that the criminalization of fighting words using race or religion was
viewpoint neutral because either side of a debate could use them. 15 2 The

148. Compare LA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391-93 (1992) (Scalia, J.), with id. at 41921 (Stevens, J., concurring). Compare Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
830-32 (1996) (Kennedy, J.), with id. at 894-97 (Souter, J., dissenting).
149. See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
151. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
152. See id. at 424-25 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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majority in that case rejected this approach, however, explaining that, as
compared to someone who chose not to rely on racially based fighting words,
53
the person who did was disadvantaged on the basis of viewpoint.1
Likewise, in Rosenberger, Justice Souter argued in his dissent that the
prohibition against subsidizing religious perspectives was not viewpoint
discriminatory because it would apply to all religion-oriented advocacy,
including advocacy by atheists and agnostics. 154 The majority in that case
disagreed, however, pointing out that the person who wished to discuss an
issue from a religious perspective would be disadvantaged as compared to
the person who wanted to discuss it from a nonreligious perspective.' 55 Thus,
prior to Finley, the state clearly did not need to explicitly single out a specific
or narrow point of view in order to commit viewpoint discrimination.
Focusing on one category, approach, or perspective that was itself defined by
viewpoint or message was more than sufficient, even though it could
encompass many disparate subviewpoints or counterarguments.
To the extent that the Court suggested that decency and respect are best
considered modes or styles of speech with no particular message or
viewpoint, the Finley opinion also seems inconsistent with both the common
understanding of the terms and the precedent. Justices Scalia and Souter
illustrated that decency and respect are not simply content-hollow terms but
do indeed have well-understood meanings that encompass particular
perspectives. 156 Moreover, to treat decency and respect as nothing more than
styles of speech seems inconsistent with well-established precedents such as
Cohen v. California157 and Texas v. Johnson. 58 In Cohen, the Court
confronted the question of whether the state could prohibit displaying the
word "fluck" under an offensive conduct statute.159 In an oft-quoted opinion
written by Justice Harlan, the Court reasoned that such offensive language
was not simply a regrettable style of expression but carried both
communicative and emotive impact. 160 Likewise, in Johnson, Justice
Rehnquist argued in his dissent that the state statute criminalizing desecration
of a flag as applied to the burning of an American flag in protest did not
single out a message, but merely prohibited one means of communication

153. See id. at 391-92.

154. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 895-96 (1996) (Souter,
J., dissenting).
155.
156.
157.
158.

See id. at 831-32.
See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
403 U.S. 15 (1971).
491 U.S. 397 (1989).

159. See 403 U.S. at 16.
160. See id. at 25-26.
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that the Chief Justice compared to an inarticulate grunt. 16' The majority
rejected this interpretation, however, holding that the statute was clearly
viewpoint discriminatory. 62 Thus, if Finley suggests that the decency and
respect criteria of section 954(d)(1) simply focus on content empty modes of
communication, then it conflicts with well-regarded precedent.
Although disingenuous and inconsistent with a great deal of wellestablished doctrine, there is every reason to believe that the Finley Court's
treatment of the viewpoint discrimination issue does not signal a significant
change of direction by the Court. At the outset, Finley may present a very
limited threat to the current jurisprudence of viewpoint discrimination simply
because the reasoning of the case is so obscure. The Court seemed to believe
that viewpoint discrimination did not present a major problem in the case but
it never clearly explained why. By leaving the reader to wonder what the
Court meant, subsequent courts will have the opportunity to reject
troublesome interpretations of the opinions as misunderstandings or
overreactions.
The Court seemed to hedge its discussion of viewpoint discrimination by
limiting its consideration to an on-the-face challenge. It suggested that it
would be far more troubled if an applicant could actually demonstrate that
the section 954(d)(1) criteria had been applied in a viewpoint discriminatory
manner. Indeed, the overwhelming number of viewpoint discrimination cases
involve as-applied challenges. Finley may simply mean that viewpoint
discrimination can only be established in an on-the-face challenge by
demonstrating that the regulation does and was intended to single out a very
specific point of view. Although this may not make much sense, it may not
do much harm either.
Finally, Finley's discussion of viewpoint discrimination arose in the
context of subsidized speech rather than regulation. A fair amount of
precedent suggests that this should not matter,16 3 but the Finley majority
seemed to suggest otherwise. As the final Part of this Article will clarify,
perhaps the lesson of Finley should be that the state may engage in some
viewpoint discrimination in subsidy programs that would not be permissible
elsewhere.

161. See 491 U.S. at 431-32 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
162. See id. at411-12.
163. See supranote 110 and accompanying text; infra notes 171-8O and accompanying text.
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B. The UnconstitutionalConditions Doctrine
The other major doctrinal area implicated by Finley is the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine. This doctrine, broadly construed, states
that the Government may not require a person to relinquish a constitutional
right in order to receive a Government benefit and vice versa. 164 The Court
has applied the doctrine with great inconsistency and confusion, and it is
widely5 considered one of the most difficult areas in all of constitutional
6
law.'
Section 954(d) certainly could be analyzed pursuant to the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine. The rhetoric of unconstitutional
conditions, however, was not an important part of the Finley case and its
history. Although the district court invalidated section 954(d)(1) primarily on
vagueness grounds, it noted that the record was insufficiently developed to
warrant summary judgment on the unconstitutional conditions theory. 166 The
court of appeals hardly addressed the unconstitutional conditions doctrine,
noting that it had not been properly presented. 67 The respondent addressed
the doctrine very briefly in its brief to the Supreme Court, but it clearly was
not the primary focus of its argmaent.1 68 The Court itself addressed the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine but rather obliquely.
The Court's precedents, particularly Rosenberger, which indicate that
viewpoint discrimination in a subsidy program is generally unconstitutional,
largely overshadow the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in the arts
69
funding context because they provide a far less complicated challenge.1
In FCCv. League of Women Voters,170 the Court ruled that the state could
not require public television stations to refrain from editorializing in
exchange for federal funding, especially considering that these subsidies
164. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, UnconstitutionalConditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415 (1989).
165. See generally FARBER, supra note 147, at 203; Sullivan, supra note 164; Cass R. Sunstein,
Why the Unconstitutionat Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism (With ParticularReference to
Religion, Speech, andAbortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593 (1990).

166. See Finley v. NEA, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1472 (C.D. Cal. 1992).
167. See Finley v. NEA, 100 F.3d 671,674 n.1 (9th Cir. 1996).
168. See Respondents' Brief at *48-*49, NEA v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998) (No. 97-371),
available in 1998 WL 47281 (Feb. 6, 1998).
169. During the course of oral argument, one of the Justices suggested to David Cole, counsel for
respondents, that his entire case rested on Rosenberger. See United States Supreme Court Official
Transcript at *52, Finley (No. 97-371), available in 1998 WL 15955 (Mar. 31, 1998). He denied that
this was the case, citing Lamb's Chapel v Center Moriches Union FreeSchool District,508 U.S. 384
(1993), and Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985), both of
which are viewpoint discrimination precedents.
170. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
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constituted only a small portion of the stations' revenues. 171 Conversely, in
Regan v. Taxation with Representation,172 the Court allowed the state to
condition tax exemptions granted to organizations on an agreement not to use
tax exempt funds to lobby because the organizations could set up separate
structures for lobbying with non-tax exempt funds. 173 Thus, a requirement to
refrain from exercising a constitutional right as a condition for receiving a
Government subsidy is especially vulnerable to challenge if the condition
extends to funds or conduct beyond the subsidy itself.
Rust v. Sullivan 74 added a new wrinkle to the analysis. There, the Court
considered a federal regulation requiring recipients of a federal subsidy for
family planning projects to agree not to discuss abortion as an option or
engage in abortion referral. 175 The Court upheld the regulation on the ground
that it was not an unconstitutional condition, but simply the definition of the
program's scope. 176 In other words, the state has the right to subsidize one
type of activity (preconception family planning counseling) rather than
another (postconception counseling considering abortion). Further, to protect
the integrity of the program, it may condition the receipt of the funds on an
agreement to use them for the former purpose but not the latter. An obvious
difficulty with this approach, as commentators have pointed out, is that it
places few constraints on the Government's ability to skew public debate
177
through its initial decisions as to funding priorities and program definition.
The Rust Court did place some limit on the discretion of the state in this
regard by declaring in dicta that the state's ability to limit speech through

conditional spending would be far more constrained in areas traditionally
dedicated to freedom of speech such as public forums and public
universities.17 8 Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of

Virginia'79 presented such a case, and the Court invalidated as viewpoint
discriminatory a rule that prohibited the University from paying the printing

costs of a student publication that "primarily promotes180 or manifests a
particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality."'

To place the Finley challenge to section 954(d)(1) in an unconstitutional

171.

See id. at 370-73.

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

461 U.S. 540 (1983).
Seeid. at550.
500U.S. 173(1991).
Seeid. at 179.
See id. at 193-94.
See, e.g., Redish & Kessler, supra note 36, at 576.
See Rust, 500 U.S. at 200.
515 U.S. 819 (1995).
Id. at 822-23.
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conditions framework, the Government argued that the criteria of decency
and respect simply defined the scope of the program as in Rust and did not
interfere with the artist's ability to create indecent and disrespectful art with
private funds.'18 In response, the challengers argued that publicly funded art
was an example of an institution dedicated to free speech similar to the
public forum and the public university mentioned in Rosenberger. As such,
the state could no more place viewpoint-based restrictions on NEA grants
82
than could the University on its subsidies in Rosenberger.1
Moreover, NEA
grants have an impact on art produced by private funds because, by law, the
grants can only subsidize fifty percent of the project's cost. Also, the grants
play an important
role in attracting private support to artists and
83
institutions.
Several leading commentators have developed extensive theoretical
frameworks for analyzing unconstitutional conditions issues. 184 As is
generally the case, however, the Court has shown no interest in them. The
Court is more than content to build on its precedents incrementally, however
confused they may be.
Essentially, the Court put an additional qualification on the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine as it had developed from League of
Women Voters and Regan to Rust. The challengers hoped to avoid Rust and
ride Rosenbergerto the victory circle. The Court foiled the plan, however, by
distinguishing Rosenberger as a case of a viewpoint-based condition on an
otherwise widely available subsidy; NEA grants, conversely, are competitive
in nature and as such must be judged by criteria that to some extent will be
content oriented.18 5 Thus, Rosenberger might control a widely available,
first-come-first-served arts funding program, but not a selective program
based on artistic excellence. But even if the state may rely on relatively
viewpoint-neutral criteria (such as artistic excellence in a competitive grant
process), it may not necessarily rely on obviously more viewpoint-based
considerations (such as decency and respect). Nevertheless, the majority wis
not inclined to address that response.

181. See Petitioner's Brief at *37-*40, NEA v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998) (No. 97-371),
availablein 1998 WL 11935 (Jan. 9, 1998).
182. See Respondent's Brief'at *30-*33, Finley (No. 97-371), available in 1998 WL 47281.
183. See id. at *37-*38.
184. See Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term-Foreword: Unconstitutional
Conditions,State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988); Seth F. Kreimer,
AllocationalSanctions: The Problem ofNegative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293
(1984); Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions and Religious Schools,
104 HARV. L. REV. 989 (1991); Sullivan, supranote 164.
185. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
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Under the majority's approach, an unconstitutional conditions analysis
will not carry the day in a dispute regarding a competitive process. As with
viewpoint discrimination, however, the majority limited its analysis to the
context of an on-the-face challenge. 186 The majority cautioned that the case
would present a different problem if the NEA denied a specific grant based
on its viewpoint. Perhaps, then, the competitive-process exception evaporates
in as-applied challenges. Yet immediately after suggesting this distinction,
the majority cited Rust v. Sullivan and Maher v. Roe for the proposition that
the Government can selectively fund whatever it chooses without obligation
to underwrite alternative approaches or points of view. 18 7 This suggests that
Rust may have seriously undermined much of the existing unconstitutional
conditions precedent, Rosenbergernotwithstanding.
The majority did not necessarily disregard the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine. Because the precedents in this area are sufficiently malleable, the
Court is able to do generally whatever it chooses. Nevertheless, the majority
left unconstitutional conditions analysis more confused than it found it, and
that is no mean feat. Unconstitutional conditions analysis may now play a
seriously diminished role in the viewpoint-conditioned subsidy case because
straightforward viewpoint discrimination analysis seems more appropriate, at
it is applicable. That seemed to be the case throughout the Finley
least when
1 88
litigation.
VI. A SUGGESTED RERATIONALIZATION OF FINLEY
The majority opinion in Finley is a confusing stew of partially complete
and inconsistent arguments. Justice Scalia's concurrence was clearly
developed but too radical a break from existing doctrine to attract a majority
of the Court. Justice Souter's argument was well reasoned and largely
consistent with existing doctrine and yet he was unable to obtain even one
other vote. The Court did not provide even a minimally persuasive rationale
for its holding.
Inconsistencies in the opinion suggest that this may largely be attributable
to sharp doctrinal and theoretical disagreements on the Court. Under such
circumstances, it would be pointless to ask the Court to convincingly

186. See supranote 83 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
188. Arguably, Finley is additional evidence that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine serves
no useful purpose that is not already achieved by more pertinent doctrines and thus should be
abandoned. See Sunstein, supra note 165. Professor Schauer has suggested that the Court's opinion in
Finleymay be the "epitaph" for the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. See Schauer, supranote 147.
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explicate a rationale that a majority of the Justices refused to accept.'8 9 The
Court can only provide as much guidance and explanation as is practicable.
On the other hand, it is also possible that the Court deliberately obscured
its analysis for strategic reasons. Perhaps it decided that upholding the
existing political compromise was definitely in the public interest but
difficult to achieve under present First Amendment doctrine that the Court
felt should not be altered. A solid majority may have coalesced around the
result and agreed to produce an opinion that, through its obscurity, does as
little damage as possible to free speech jurisprudence. Finley might then be
compared to some of the Court's decisions in the early 1950s that
legislation without
undermined the Smith Act and other anticommunist
90
confrontation.
constitutional
direct
a
provoking
It is also possible, however, that some of the Justices who joined the
opinion of the Court, indeed perhaps all of them, believed that upholding
section 954(d)(1) represented the correct understanding of the First
Amendment and not simply a prudentially defensible result. If so, the
majority failed to explain adequately why that was the case. This Part argues
that the decency and respect criteria are intuitively defensible and can be
accommodated with free speech doctrine and theory with a minimum amount
of destabilization. Still, it is debatable whether a clearer and more forthright
approach that alters existing First Amendment doctrine is preferable to an
obscure and disingenuous approach that may do less harm.
A. Attempted Justification
1. Deference to Legislative Compromise?
The question that should have dominated the Finley decision is whether
any legitimate public justification exists for the decency and respect clauses
of section 954(d). Some explanation of purpose or justification seems
particularly warranted given that the provision seems to be viewpoint
discriminatory. Thus, the quest for justification starts with recognition that
section 954(d) appears to be highly problematic under the First Amendment.
Is there a public purpose capable of sustaining this legislation? One of the

189. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizingthe Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802 (1982).
190. In a series of cases in the 1950s following Dennis v. UnitedStates, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), in
which the Court sustained the constitutionality of the Smith Act, the Court narrowed the impact of
anticommunist control legislation on free speech values through statutory construction and evidentiary
rulings rather than broader and possibly more controversial First Amendment holdings. See, eg., Noto
v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Yates v. United
States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
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most striking aspects of the majority opinion in Finley is that it never
attempts to define the contours of that public purpose or justification. At
most, it describes the statutory amendment as an attempt to strike a
compromise between those who favored elimination of the NEA, those who
favored strict prohibition of specific types of artwork, those who favored
some less particular but still meaningful restraint on NEA discretion, and
those who favored no restriction beyond artistic excellence.19 1 The attempt to
find a politically acceptable compromise among these various factions may
go a long way toward explaining how section 954(d) emerged as the
resolution of the arts funding controversy, but it does not explain why this
specific vehicle-the decency and respect clause-serves a sufficiently
important public purpose to justify its inherent viewpoint-discriminatory
nature. The reader of Finley is left with the feeling that the Court was afraid
to discuss the purpose of the provision for fear that this purpose was
indefensible or at least insufficient.
If the purpose of the amendment was simply to prohibit, discourage, or
punish the creation and display of a category of offensive views and
perspectives (artwork that is indecent or disrespectful)-either because those
views were unpopular or as a means of skewing debate in favor of alternative
views-then it would seem that the law should be considered a forbidden
example of viewpoint discrimination. Not only would this purpose be
insufficient, it would even be illegitimate. Such a law could be saved only by
concluding, as Justice Scalia did, that First Amendment principles do not
apply to subsidization decisions.
2. Concernfor Taxpayer Sensibilities
The Court did set forth another justification that it never really
considered. Congress created this justification when it enacted section 954(d)
along with amendments to the declaration of findings and purposes of the
Act, stating that arts funding should "contribute to public support and
confidence in the use of taxpayer funds." 192 Presumably, Congress was
exhibiting a legitimate interest in protecting the taxpaying public from being
forced to subsidize art that deeply offends a large segment of society (most
likely a majority) because of its indecency or disrespect for widely shared
beliefs and values. As a result, the decency and respect clause was not
intended to censor or discourage the creation of offensive art or to skew the
marketplace of art and ideas in favor of Government approved orthodoxy.

191. See NEA v. Finley, 118 S. Ct 2168, 2176 (1998).
192. 20 U.S.C. § 951(5) (1994).
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Accordingly, artists may continue to be as indecent and disrespectful as they
desire. They simply should not be allowed to inflict on the taxpaying public
the indignity of having to pay for such art.
Congressional debates reflected such a position. Representative
Rohrabacher concisely summarized the principle as "on their time with their
dime." 193 In an earlier debate, Senator Helms, a leading proponent of
restricting the NEA, argued that the American people "have a right not to be
denigrated, offended, or mocked with their own tax dollars" and that "no
194
artist has a preemptive claim on the tax dollars of the American people."'
During the debate before the House of Representatives in 1990,
Representative Coleman, a cosponsor of the provision that became section
954(d), explained:
[W]e want more accountability to the taxpayer without intruding on
the constitutional creativity and rights of all Americans....
... Works which deeply offend the sensibilities of significant
portions of the public ought not be supported with public funds. That
is a statement of common sense, of prudence, of sensibility to the
beliefs and values195of those who, after all, pay the taxes to support this
Federal agency."'
96
Several other members of Congress expressed similar sentiments. 1
Section 954(d) is arguably aimed at a type of harm distinct from the harm
prohibited by the rule against viewpoint discrimination. The latter precludes
the state from suppressing dangerous or offensive ideas, punishing purveyors
of such ideas, or skewing the debate against such ideas. In contrast, the
respect and decency clauses simply seek to relieve the public of the indignity
of compelled sponsorship of a certain category of highly offensive artwork. If
this is true, a number of issues remain open. Is the interest in protecting the
taxpayer from the harm caused by compelled sponsorship of indecent or
disrespectful art a legitimate interest, and is it significant enough to justify
viewpoint discrimination in the subsidization context? Does the protection of

193. Frohnmayer, supranote 132, at 2 (quoting Representative Rohrabacher).
194. 135 CONG. REC. 16,278 (1989) (statements of Sen. Helms).
195. 136 CONG. REc. 28,623, 28,624 (1990) (statement of Rep. Coleman).
196. See id. at 28,636 (statement of Representative Roth) ("the American people have really been
outraged by what is taking place because they feel that their hard-earned tax dollars are being used to
fiind obscene and blasphemous art, and I think that is pretty well the long and short of it"); id. at
28,639 (statement of Representative Armey) ("I do not believe we should spend NEA money for the
enjoyment of artists. I believe we should spend NEA money for the enjoyment of the public, if we
spend it at all, and that NEA grants should reflect the public's sensibilities and values."); Id. at 28,651
(statement of Representative Walker) ("It is a question of whether or not tax money should be coerced
away from hard-working Americans in order to pay for things which they regard as very obscene.").
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this interest nevertheless inflict too much harm on free speech values in the
arts funding context to permit its recognition? Finally, would recognizing
such an exception to the viewpoint-discrimination principle cut too deeply
into established First Amendment doctrine to be tolerable?
These issues are serious, and for many they are insurmountable.
Nevertheless, section 954(d) can be justified on the grounds of protecting
taxpayers from being forced to sponsor indecent and disrespectful work.
Notwithstanding the justification, whether it is preferable to the Court's
somewhat messier approach remains uncertain.
B. Considerationof Taxpayer Sensibilities as a Justificationfor Viewpoint
Discrimination
Easily the cleanest way to justify section 954(d) is to contend, as does
Justice Scalia, that free speech principles simply do not apply to
subsidization decisions. Once that step is taken, it scarcely matters what
Congress did or why. Assuming that section 954(d) is constitutionally
acceptable, it is easy enough to conjure up subsidization decisions that should
not be. Presumably, most would agree that a decision by Congress to
subsidize only speech by Democrats, or white people, or speech supportive
of Government policy should be unconstitutional. Justice Scalia indicates that
he would handle such a parade of horribles through other constitutional
provisions,1 97 presumably equal protection. Perhaps that would work if equal
protection analysis was applied with sufficient rigor. Given that these
examples present the type of viewpoint discrimination harm central to the
First Amendment, however, it seems bizarre to declare free speech analysis
off limits. Instead, the First Amendment should tolerate the decency and
respect clause but not these other examples because the harm to the taxpayer
from being forced to fund indecent and disrespectful art is a distinct and
cognizable type of harm from which Congress should be able to provide
protection. In the context of federal arts funding, the discouragement if not
the outright prohibition of grants for indecent and disrespectful art will not
undermine free speech values to an unacceptable degree. Moreover, the
recognition of such an exception to the general principles against viewpoint
discrimination will not destabilize the existing doctrinal framework.
1. ProtectionAgainst CompelledSubsidization
Direct civil or criminal prohibition of indecent or disrespectful art clearly

197. See NEA v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168,2184 n.3 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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would violate the First Amendment. To the extent that indecent art sends a
message or expresses a point of view that deeply offends some significant
segment of the public, this type of harm is simply a legitimate cost of
freedom of speech that the offended viewers must bear. They may "avert[]
their eyes," as the Court has put it.'98 It is the additional indignity of forcing
the taxpayers to pay for art that assaults their most deeply held values in a
manner violating widely shared social norms that distinguishes this from the
constitutionally acceptable harm caused by the message itself.
The artist, with the help of the NEA, is to some extent compelling the
taxpayer to sponsor the creation of deeply offensive artwork. In this sense,
Senator Helms' statement that the taxpayer has a right not to be mocked rings
true. The taxpayer certainly has no right to avoid being criticized, even with
the fruits of his labor, but taxpayers arguably should be able to preclude the
Government from forcing them to underwrite indecent assaults on their basic
values. 199
In a series of cases, the Court has recognized that the First Amendment
precludes the state from compelling an individual to engage in expressive
activity to which he objects.200 The Court has also recognized a limited First
Amendment right to be free from having to pay fees or assessments that will
be used to promote causes or speech the individual finds objectionable, at
least where the promotion is not central to the mission of the institution.01
These cases illustrate the significance of the interest in not being compelled
to support or fund objectionable messages. These compelled speech cases do
not necessarily control the arts funding issue, however. While it is fair to say
that the taxpayer is imposed upon by NEA grants to artists who create
indecent and offensive works, the taxpayer is not required to participate in
the creation of the work in any active sense, nor is the taxpayer compelled to
endorse or display the message. Moreover, the decency and respect
amendment presents the converse of the Court's mandatory funding cases.
For instance, in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,2°2 an individual
asserted a First Amendment right to be free from contributing funding to an

198. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S 15, 21 (1971); see also Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422
U.S. 205,211 (1975).
199. For the argument that in its managerial capacity the Government may permissibly use its
subsidization decisions to reenforce widely shared social norms such as decency and respect for
diverse beliefs and values, see Post, supra note 36, at 184-92.
200. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and BiSexual Group, 515 U.S. 557 (1995);
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705
(1977); West Virginia State Bd. ofEduc. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).

201. See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991); Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496
U.S. 1 (1990); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
202. 431 U.S. 209.
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objectionable cause that a majority of union members presumably supported.
Conversly, in the arts funding context, the majority (through congressional
legislation) decided to respect taxpayers' claims of conscience while a third
party, the potential grant recipient, raised a First Amendment objection to
that decision. Compelled funding cases like Abood do not resolve this
controversy, but they bolster the contention that the interest in not forcing
taxpayers to financially support objectionable speech is a distinct and
cognizable injury worthy of legal recognition and respect.
That this is a legitimate interest does not suggest that every disgruntled
taxpayer has the right to complain about any disbursement of federal funds to
promote a message or cause with which he disagrees. Unlike the First
Amendment based compelled speech cases like Abood, the interest in
protecting the taxpayer in the arts funding context is asserted not by a
dissenting member of the polity but by the majority of Americans through
the legislative process. As a result, not every malcontent would have the
power to bring the Government to a halt. Professor Fiss argues that it is
inappropriate to think of Government funds as contributions from citizens in
which they still have some cognizable stake.203 Rather, it is the
Government's money to spend as it sees fit. Doubtlessly, most Americans
would reject this characterization. Assuming they accept it, though, it would
only be pertinent if dissenting taxpayers objected to the Government's actual
disposition of the funds. In arts funding, the Government allocates the funds
in a way that attempts to take account of taxpayer sensibilities.
2. ProtectingLegitimate Taxpayer Sensibilities
Still, to contend that protecting taxpayer sensibilities is a legitimate
governmental interest is radically incomplete. The obvious question is
protection against what. Section 954(d) provides the answer: protection
against art that is either indecent or disrespectful of the diverse beliefs and
values of Americans. Nevertheless, whether the taxpayer has a valid interest
in being free of having to sponsor art that infringes these values is a question
section 954(d) does not answer.
a. Decency
The concept of decency expresses a widely shared norm and has in
certain contexts withstood First Amendment challenge. Section 954(d)(1) did
not define indecency but rather referred to "general standards of decency." At

203. See FISS, supranote 36, at 107.
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least one source for such standards is from the definition that has made its
way into the law in the broadcasting context. It focuses on language and
graphic depictions that are patently offensive by contemporary community
standards because they depict sexual or excretory activities or organs. 20 4 This
reflects a widely held though scarcely universal belief that graphic depictions
of sexuality and excretory activity are inappropriate, at least in public. This
would cover the most controversial of the Mapplethorpe photographs that
ignited the NEA funding controversy, and arguably Serrano's Piss Christ as
well. It is fair to say that much if not most of the anger directed at NEA
funding decisions was provoked by the knowledge that the taxpayer was
paying for patently offensive art of a sexually explicit nature.
While indecent but nonobscene speech (and art) is protected by the First
Amendment, the state has the right to prohibit its broadcast over the public
airwaves during those hours when children are most likely to be listening or
watching. 205 Admittedly, section 954(d)(1) has nothing to do with protecting
children. Nevertheless, at the heart of the concept of indecency is the rather
obvious recognition that for most people, sexuality is largely a private and
deeply personal matter-for many, a sacred matter. Thus, for a large segment
of the public, sexually explicit art is extraordinarily offensive, inappropriate,
and indeed immoral. Although the First Amendment protects indecent but
nonobscene speech, the fact that the Court has addressed the constitutionality
of legislative and administrative attempts to regulate indecent speech in so
many different media contexts during the past twenty years 20 6 indicates that
the value of decency is a widely shared and deeply felt societal norm.20 7
b. Respectfor Diverse Beliefs and Values
Unlike indecency, the concept of respect for the diverse beliefs and values
of the American people has no established legal pedigree. 20 8 Read literally, it

204. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 732 (1978) (quoting In re Pacifica Found., 56
F.C.C. 2d 94,98 (1975) (declaratory order)).
205. See id.; see also Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (1995), cert. denied,
516 U.S. 1043 (1996).
206. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (indecency on Internet); Denver Area Educ.
Television Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996) (indecency on leased and public access cable
channels); Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (indecency over
telephone); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (indecency on public radio airwaves).

207. Cf Post, supra note 36, at 191 (making observation that "the fact that family values are
popular and commonly shared, or, in Fiss's demeaning term, 'orthodox,' would not be grounds for
abandoning a posture of judicial deference because, as we have seen, these attributes are precisely
what authenticate the government's support of family values as reasonable and legitimate").
208. Respect for diverse beliefs and values presents greater First Amendment problems than the

concept of decency, but if construed narrowly, it is also can coexist with freedom of speech in the
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might disfavor any artwork that is highly critical of almost anything that
some segment of the population holds dear. Such a reading would cut deeply
into free discourse in the art world because it would suggest that anything
controversial is almost by definition a problematic candidate for funding. In
context, however, there is no reason to read the phrase so broadly. When
coupled with indecency and considered with the circumstances giving rise to
the adoption of section 954(d), the concept of respect for diverse beliefs and
values should be read to encompass works, such as Serrano's Piss Christ,
that deliberately assault deeply cherished values or deliberately inflict pain in
a manner that transgresses widely shared norms ofpropriety.
Blasphemous art would often be considered sufficiently disrespectful of
diverse beliefs and values. Likewise, racial hate speech or particularly
offensive depictions of women or homosexuals would also violate this norm
as would particularly insensitive treatment of the dead. If limited to artwork
that a large segment of the public would consider to be well beyond the
bounds of legitimate comment and criticism, the respect criteria does not
prohibit vigorous and pointed criticism of the status quo through publicly
financed art. Indeed, the emphasis on "diverse" beliefs and values ensures
that it does not simply enshrine majoritarian preferences. Rather, it applies
only to that art which is clearly beyond the pale of civil discourse.
One difficulty with the foregoing construction is that it arguably attempts
to achieve the same goals as the Rohrabacher amendment that was rejected in
favor of the current section 954(d). Congressman Rohrabacher's altemative
would have prohibited the use of NEA grants for the depiction, promotion,
distribution, or dissemination of, among other things: denigration of "the
beliefs, tenets, or objects of a particular religion" or of a group or individual
"on the basis of race, sex, handicap, or national origin," or of work in which
the U.S. flag is "mutilated, defaced, physically defiled, [or] burned. 20 9
Arguably, Congress may not have intended respect for diverse beliefs and
values to bear the interpretation offered here simply because it largely
parallels the rejected Rohrabacher approach. This is not a particularly
persuasive objection, however. Certainly, Congress meant something by the
phrase "respect for diverse beliefs and values." From a free speech
standpoint, a narrower or limited interpretation seems preferable to one that
would disfavor art work that was to any extent critical or disrespectful. More
significantly, despite an overlap in purpose between the Rohrabacher
amendment and any plausible construction of the "respect" criteria, section

subsidization context.
209. 136 CONG. REC. 28,657 (1990) (amendments en bloc offered by Congressman Rohrabacher).
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954(d) is easily distinguishable and was no doubt preferable to a majority of
the House. Section 954(d) merely required the NEA to take decency and
respect into consideration as opposed to flatly prohibiting funding.
Additionally, it did not specify the prohibited perspectives with the
troublesome particularity exhibited by the Rohrabacher amendment.
C. Impact on Freedom of Speech
1. The Selective Subsidization Context
Decency and respect for diverse beliefs and values are widely shared
social norms that deserve consideration and support. It is well settled,
however, that the First Amendment protects indecent and disrespectful
speech, and the state cannot prohibit or censor such speech. 21 This is
certainly the case with respect to blasphemy,21 1 racial hate speech, 212 and
nonobscene pornography, l3 even though these types of speech can inflict
significant personal and societal harm. Therefore, if section 954(d) is
constitutionally acceptable, it must be because the state has greater authority
to employ viewpoint-oriented criteria in the subsidization context.
There are good reasons why this should be the case. First, as previously
noted, 14 there is the significant interest in a subsidization context in avoiding
the potential indignity suffered by the taxpayer as a result of compelled
sponsorship that does not exist in a regulatory setting. Equally as important,
the use of the decency and respect criteria in competitive subsidization
decisions generally results in less harm to free speech values. Critical to this
analysis is the fact that the Government has no affirmative duty to subsidize
speech or art.21 5 Thus, any cognizable harm to free speech interests flows
from a decision to selectively subsidize, as in the NEA funding context,
rather than from a decision not to subsidize at all. This is critical because
subsidization of speech, indeed even viewpoint-based selective subsidization,
will generally increase rather than diminish the amount of speech or art
available. By definition, a competitive grant program, such as the NEA arts
funding, awards funds to one artist and inevitably denies them to many

210. See, e.g., Reno, 521 U.S. 844; see also, e.g., Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Fighting Back:
Offensive Speech and Cultural Conflict, 46 SMU L. REV. 145 (1992).
211. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
212. See RA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
213. See American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), afj'd, 475
U.S. 1001 (1986).
214. See supraPart VI.A.2.
215. See NEA v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168,2186 n.2 (1998) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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others. If selective subsidization decisions harm free speech interests, it is not
because many artists find it more difficult to create their work due to lack of
Government funding. Rather, it is because Congress created selection criteria
or the process that has skewed the marketplace in favor of or against a
particular topic, perspective, or viewpoint. 6
Because decency and respect for diverse beliefs and values are viewpoint
oriented, the risk of distorting the source of harm to free speech is certainly
present. Art that challenges social conventions through indecency or
disrespect for beliefs and values will be disadvantaged, at least with respect
to federal funding. Two factors, however, should significantly mitigate the
impact on the marketplace of ideas. First, as the Finley majority observed,
Congress did not target narrower or more specific viewpoints. As previously
noted, 1 7 this does not render the decency and respect criteria viewpoint
neutral, but it does minimize the degree to which an artist would be
precluded from creating art that conveys a critical perspective. Second,
although the impact of NEA funding on the production of art is hotly
contested,21 8 it seems highly unlikely that indecent and disrespectful art are
even minimally dependent on federal subsidization for continued
existence. 21 9 The very notion that artists could not adequately challenge
social norms by violating those norms absent the financial support of the very
people whose norms are being violated seems too bizarre to be taken
seriously.220 Consequently, the danger of skewing the marketplace against
indecent and disrespectful art, though hardly nonexistent, is certainly
insubstantial in this context. Finally, section 954(d) only calls for
consideration of decency and respect. As the Court mentioned, Congress has
not totally precluded the subsidization of indecent or disrespectful art.22 This
further mitigates the actual impact of the decency and respect criteria on the
artistic marketplace of ideas. It should be noted, however, that a focus on the
harm to the taxpayer would not necessarily distinguish between taking these
factors into consideration and prohibiting funding outright. Arguably,
"consideration" is the most that freedom of speech can afford to grant the

216. See Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831-32 (1995).
217. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
218. See Post, supra note 36, at 193-94 n.208 (summarizing research on this issue).
219. See Hamilton, supra note 36, at 118 (arguing that the art world is not dependent on federal
funding for its vitality much less its survival). But see Donald W. Hawthorne, Subversive
Subsidization: How NEA Art Funding Abridges Private Speech, 40 U. KAN. L. REv. 437, 443-44
(1992).
220. See generally Daniel Shapiro, Free Speech and Art Subsidies, 14 LAw & PHIL. 329, 344
(1995).
221. See NEA v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2176 (1998); see also supra note 44 and accompanying

text.
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taxpayer. But if the taxpayer truly has a significant interest in not being
compelled to sponsor offensive art, the interest would be protected more
effectively by outright prohibition than by mere consideration. That type of
taxpayer protection, however, cuts more deeply into First Amendment
interests than does the Court's approach. Because Congress only required
consideration in section 954(d), this problem need not be confronted.
2. An Exception to the Rule Against Viewpoint Discrimination
Permitting Congress to protect the taxpaying public against having to
subsidize highly offensive art may cause only minimal harm to the artistic
marketplace of ideas, but it might cause more serious harm to the Court's
established free speech doctrine. As Justice Souter noted, the prohibition
against viewpoint discrimination is a fundamental principle of modem free
speech doctrine. 22 At the very least, viewpoint discrimination is not
constitutionally permissible absent a compelling state interest.223 Protecting
the taxpayer against compelled subsidization of offensive speech is a
legitimate interest, arguably even a substantial interest, but scarcely a
compelling state interest as the Court uses the term. 224 Thus, conceding that
the state could use at least certain viewpoint-discriminatory criteria in the
subsidization context would create an ad hoc exception to well-established
doctrine. Considering the foregoing analysis, however, such an exception is
justifiable and readily limited to the subsidization context. Nevertheless, any
explicit exception to the rule against viewpoint discrimination is cause for
some concern.
Presumably, such concern is why the Finley majority was so reluctant to
acknowledge that decency and respect were viewpoint oriented. Justices
Scalia and Souter demonstrated that the criteria are in fact viewpoint based.
Because they were probably correct in their demonstrations, although, as the
majority believes, the criteria could have been much more viewpoint
oriented, the options are to follow Justice Souter and conclude that section
954(d) is unconstitutional on its face, to follow Justice Scalia and conclude
that First Amendment principles do not apply to subsidies at all, or to

222. See Finley, 118 S. Ct. at 2185 (Souter, J., dissenting).
223. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118
(1991); Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221,231 (1987).
224. There is no clear agreement as to what interests are compelling under the First Amendment,
but one may assume that these would be interests of the highest social order, such as protecting
national security or preventing imminent acts of violence. See generally Stephen E. Gottlieb,
Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential but Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional
Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917 (1988).
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contend that this particular instance of viewpoint discrimination is
constitutionally justifiable.n 5
3. The Advantages of a Taxpayer Exception
The third alternative above is more candid and less confusing than the
majority's approach. Also, it inflicts less damage to established First
Amendment doctrine than Justice Scalia's approach. It cannot be executed,
however, without at least some deviation from the Court's seemingly
ironclad rule against viewpoint discrimination promoted by Justice Souter.
Much can be said in favor of constructing and honoring bright-line rules to
preserve freedom of expression.226 If doctrine were inviolable, however,
Justice Souter would have written the majority opinion in Finley invalidating
section 954(d). Dissenting from the court of appeals' opinion in Finley that
followed existing doctrine to its logical conclusion, Judge Kleinfeld observed
that "[t]he First Amendment does not prohibit the free exercise of common
sense." 7 A limited exception to the rule against viewpoint discrimination in
the arts funding context makes sense, can be confined (at least to the
subsidization context), and arguably explains and justifies the Finley
decision-and hence the current state of the law-more adequately than the
Finley majority opinion.
a. A Sensible Fit with Rosenberger
Perhaps the most significant challenge to any attempted justification of
section 954(d) is whether it can be squared with the recent decision in
Rosenberger. Although Rosenberger was decided by a far narrower margin
than Finley, it seems correctly decided and nothing in Finley advocates its
reconsideration. Indeed, the author of the primary dissent in Rosenberger,
Justice Souter, considered it to be the controlling precedent in Finley. Thus,
an explanation of the result in Finley must account for the decision in
Rosenberger.

225. For the recognition that "some forms of viewpoint discrimination by government enterprises
are permissible and some forms are not," see Schauer, supra note 147, at 106.
226. See Schauer, supra note 147, at 111; Vincent Blasi, The PathologicalPerspective and the
FirstAmendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 474-80 (1985). See generallyFrederick Schauer, Codifying
the FirstAmendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 285, 313-15; Frederick Schauer,
Categoriesand the FirstAmendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REv. 265 (1981) (discussing
"categorization" in First Amendment jurisprudence); Kathleen Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991
Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992) (discussing
advantages of rules over standards and vice versa).
227. Finley v. NEA, 100 F.3d 671, 684 (9th Cir. 1996) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
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One might distinguish Rosenberger's holding on the ground that
publishing material with a distinct religious perspective is not nearly as
offensive, and thus not as great of an imposition on the unwilling taxpayer, as
is indecent or disrespectful art. A lengthy Establishment Clause tradition,
however, dating at least as far back as Jefferson's Bill of Religious
Liberties 228 and Madison's Remonstrance,229 could be cited to the contrary.
Instead, the focus on the harm to the taxpayer as a result of compelled
subsidization provides the best basis for distinguishing Rosenberger.
The majority in Finley distinguished Rosenbergeron the ground that the
subsidy in that case was widely available while the one at issue in Finley was
awarded on a competitive basis. The majority failed, however, to adequately
explain why this should matter. Arguably, this distinction is significant. The
offense to the taxpayer should not be as great where it is understood that the
recipient of a subsidy who uses it to engage in offensive speech or to create
offensive art was entitled to the grant as a matter of course, and was not
subject to a discretionary choice by the Government to single out offensive
art and reward it. In the context of a broad-based nondiscretionary grant
program such as in Rosenberger, the taxpayer should obviously understand
that the Government had little choice but to award the grant. That fact may
not wholly eliminate the indignity of being forced to subsidize offensive
speech, but it should go a long way toward minimizing it.
In a sense, Justice Scalia's distinction of Rosenberger as a public-forum
case makes the same point. Allowing speakers to use a public forum is a type
of subsidy, but because it is made available on a nondiscretionary basis, the
taxpayer should understand that the Government is not using public funds to
select and prefer an offensive assault on community norms; rather, it is
simply playing host to all points of view. The Court recognized this
understanding in Capitol Square v. Pinette,23 ° in which the plurality opinion
explained that a cross erected by the Ku Klux Klan in a public forum on the
capitol grounds would be perceived231as private speech rather than as a
Government endorsement of religion.

228. See An act for establishing religious freedom, 12 WILLIAM WALLER HENING, HENING'S
STATUTES AT LARGE 84 (University Press of Virginia 1969) (1823) ("An act for establishing religious
freedom").
229. See Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in 2 WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 183, 186 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901).
230. 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (plurality opinion).
231. See id. at 760-63.
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b. A NarrowFocus Limiting FutureMisuse
A rationale of Finley focusing on the harm to the taxpayer is significantly
narrower than both Justice Scalia's approach and the approach hinted at in
section Il-B of the Court's opinion, each to the effect that the First
Amendment has little if any application to subsidization decisions. Such a
rationale assumes that free speech principles, including the rule against
viewpoint discrimination, generally apply to Government subsidies, at least
to the extent left open by Rust v. Sullivan. The rationale also simply
recognizes a specific exception.
A taxpayer-focused explanation of Finley presents both advantages and
disadvantages compared to the majority's approach. Perhaps its greatest
advantage, its simplicity and clarity, is also its greatest disadvantage. As a
general rule, clarity in judicial opinions is desirable because they explain the
law and provide guidance for the future. An opinion such as the majority
opinion in Finley, which seems based on a complicated combination of
several considerations, some of which seem inconsistent with others, offers
little guidance or predictability. Nevertheless, if Finley represents a
prudential decision to validate a political compromise designed to lay to rest
a nagging controversy, then perhaps guidance and predictability are not
paramount. If the Finley Court needed to deviate from established doctrine in
order to bring closure to the arts funding controversy, then doing so in a clear
and precise manner may not necessarily have been a virtue. A muddled
opinion may inflict less harm on First Amendment values than one which
attempts to stake out a more clearly understandable exception. On the other
hand, it may cause greater harm. Several themes could be extracted from the
Finley opinion and used to limit free speech. For example, the Finley opinion
could be used to argue that viewpoint-based criteria are not viewpoint based
after all. Also, it could be used to argue that only the most specific viewpoint
discrimination can be challenged in an on-the-face attack. Additionally, it
could be used to argue that there is a wide berth for the use of viewpointoriented criteria in a competitive selection process. Finally, it could be used
to argue that the First Amendment scarcely applies in the subsidy context.
While the confused nature of the opinion might limit its impact, it might also
render it capable of producing all sorts of mischief.
A rationale focusing on the harm to taxpayers creates an exception to the
protective prohibition against viewpoint discrimination, but it is a narrow and
defined exception, limited to highly offensive speech in the subsidization
context. Any precedent can be misused, but there is arguably less danger
lurking within this focused rationale than in the scattershot approach of the
Finley majority opinion.
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c. A More Satisfying Explanation
The taxpayer-focused approach is an arguably sounder approach because
it addresses the central question of the purpose of section 954(d) that the
majority opinion completely ignores. Generally, it is difficult to explain why
a controversial limitation on freedom of speech is constitutional without
confronting what the limitation is intended to accomplish; yet, that is
precisely what the Finley Court seemed to do. The Finley majority treated
section 954(d) as simply the result of a political compromise designed to
salvage the NEA, offering no further independent justification. The Court
made no attempt, aside from emphasizing pure political expediency, to
explain why decency and respect were chosen rather than some other
alternative. This hardly seems sufficient to justify viewpoint-discriminatory
criteria.
Arguably, the Court may have avoided consideration of a taxpayerprotective justification because it appeared to be an improper statutory
purpose. The respondents so argued in their brief, asserting that the
congressional emphasis on taxpayer confidence was simply a thinly
disguised rationalization of viewpoint discrimination.232 Notwithstanding the
Court's possible concerns, the justification should be acceptable as long as its
purpose or impact is not to suppress offensive artwork or to exclude such
artwork from the marketplace, but rather to channel the funding of such
artwork from the public to the private sphere. If the Court believed that
protecting the confidence or sensibilities of the taxpaying public was an
improper or inadequate justification, hnd if it was unable to identify any other
acceptable purpose, then it should have invalidated the law.
D. Three OtherPossible Criticisms
Three other possible criticisms of this alternative rationale of Finley can
be made, all of which can also be leveled at the majority opinion itself, at
least to some extent. First, one might argue that an explicit exclusion of
indecent and disrespectful art from public subsidization fails to appreciate the
role of art. It critiques, often quite mercilessly, society, dominant culture, the
status quo, and previous artistic movements. 23 Much of the art that is likely

232. Respondents Brief at *13, NEA v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998) (No. 97-371), available in
1998 WL 47281.
233. See generally Hamilton, supra note 36, at 77-107; Courtney Randolph Nea, Content
Restrictions and NationalEndowmentfor the Arts Funding:An Analysisfrom the Artist's Perspective,
2 ,VM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 165, 174-77 (1993); Shapiro, supra note 220, at 344. It can even be
argued that postmodern movements in art, which challenge the very idea that there can be
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to encounter resistence under the decency or respect clause is oppositional
art; that is, art intended to assault, outrage, and even repel the viewer,
presumably in an attempt to get him or her to reconsider entrenched biases.234
Arguably, if the purpose of at least some art is to engage in a radical critique
of the status quo, it is antithetical to deprive it of funding simply because it
does what it is supposed to do well.
Nevertheless, the critical function of art can be overstated. Even assuming
that good art is often critical, it does not follow that any more than a small
percentage of art will be indecent or disrespectful of diverse beliefs and
cultures (at least in the extreme sense that the phrase used in section
954(d)(1) should be interpreted). Artists have an all but infinite number of
ways to mount scathing attacks on contemporary mores with little fear of
running aground of the decency and respect criteria. To the extent that
oppositional art and section 954(d)(1) are on a collision course, it is not due
to a failure to understand or appreciate such art, but rather to a deliberate
value choice to limit the extent to which the public must suffer the insult of
having to pay for art that attacks its most basic beliefs and values in a
particularly offensive way. Proponents of oppositional art will disagree with
this choice, but they must understand that it is not a choice that can be
explained only as a consequence of artistic ignorance.
A second criticism is that section 954(d) and virtually any of its defenses
fail to appreciate the degree to which the art world generally, or publicly
subsidized art in particular, is a traditional sphere of robust and unrestrained
discourse. 235 As such, publicly subsidized art is the equivalent of a public
forum in which viewpoint discrimination is strictly prohibited.
The short response to this criticism, as the Court recognized, is that the
competitive and selective nature of the NEA grant program distinguishes it
from an open forum. A program that, by definition, is limited to works
judged to be artistically excellent and is structured to provide support
primarily to well-established institutions will operate like a public forum
more by happenstance than by design. An arts subsidy program could be
created with the primary purpose of encouraging vigorous debate and

determinations of artistic excellence or that art is to be taken seriously, ensure that NEA grants will be
sought for the type of offensive artwork that led to the initial arts funding controversy. See Pamela
Weinstock, Note, The National Environmentforthe Arts Funding Controversy and the Miller Test: A
Pleaforthe Reunification ofArt and Society, 72 B.U. L. REV. 803 (1992).
234. See FISS, supranote 36, at 104.
235. See generally Cole, supra note 36; Thomas P. Leff, The Arts: A Traditional Sphere ofFree
Expression? First Amendment Implications of Government Funding to the Arts in the Afiermath of
Rust v. Sullivan, 45 AM. U. L. REv. 353 (1995).
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critique, but, rhetoric in the legislation notwithstanding, 236 Congress did not
create such an arts funding program. To so characterize it is to
mischaracterize it.
A final criticism, building on the work of Owen Fiss, would take the prior
argument a step further and maintain that the point of an art subsidy program
is to promote democratic discourse enabling people to engage in intelligent
self-government. 237 As such, the state is under a First Amendment based
obligation to favor art that is critical and expresses a perspective that is less
likely to be favored by market forces alone.238 Under this approach, the state
must not only tolerate art such as Mapplethorpe's photographs, it must also
affirmatively seek it out and promote it, even at the expense of favoring it
over more artistically meritorious work. 239 Professor Fiss makes clear that his
approach is based on a communal-interventionist view of the First
Amendment that is quite incompatible with the individualistic approach
favored by the Court over at least the past three decades 240 (and indeed
throughout most of the entire history of the Court's encounters with the First
Amendment).
Section 954(d)(1), which Professor Fiss conceded would be upheld under
the Court's dominant approach,24 1 and the Finley decision, whether justified
by the majority, by Justice Scalia, or by a taxpayer-oriented rationale, both
conceived of freedom of speech from a totally different perspective than does
Professor Fiss. Even Justice Souter's dissent falls squarely within the
individualistic tradition of which Professor Fiss disapproves. A vision of the
First Amendment that imposes on the state an obligation to subsidize ideas or
perspectives that are often too indecent or offensive to survive in our rather
vulgar marketplace of ideas is fortunately not the vision of freedom of speech
adopted by our dominant legal culture.
VII. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the arts funding controversy is over. If so, the Court played a
role, though not a decisive one, in laying it to rest. In most respects, the
decision in ArEA v. Finley is anticlimactic. It did not solve the problem; it
only blessed the solution. Nor did it take the occasion to develop clear and
coherent legal principles for meeting the challenge. Instead, it went out of its

236. See 20 U.S.C. § 951 (1994).
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238. See id. at 10 1-04.
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240. See id.at 12-15.
241. See id. at 97.
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way to do the opposite, perhaps because of internal disagreement, perhaps
because of doctrinal constraints, or perhaps because of prudential
considerations. This Article has attempted to show that the Court could have
offered a somewhat clearer and arguably more intuitive and candid
justification for its decision. Even so, it is uncertain whether it should have.
In view of the eight to one vote in Finley, it seems obvious that the decency
and respect criteria of section 954(d) were destined to survive constitutional
challenge. The result is a Supreme Court decision upholding viewpointdiscriminatory legislation, whether or not the Court is willing to admit it.
Such a decision arguably sets a dangerous precedent for freedom of speech
values, although much can be said for the Court's minimalistic,
"incompletely theorized" approach, as Professor Sunstein might describe it.
The Court could have offered a simpler and more direct explanation that, if
limited to the context in which it arose, would not unduly damage the Court's
speech protective doctrinal framework. Such a rationale in Finley required
five members of the Court willing to accept it, and there is no reason to
believe that might have been the case. The fact that this justification was
raised at least obliquely by the Government in its brief suggests that it may
not have been attractive to a majority of the Court. Nevertheless, it is the
most candid and intuitively sensible way to uphold the decency and respect
criteria.

